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The current Maritime Strategy envisions forward flanking
operations for the U.S. Navy in a future conflict. Soviet
development and future deployment of submarine-launched
cruise-missiles (SLCMs) in a strategic mode, specifically
their SS-NX-21's and SS-NX-24's, pose different problems to
our present maritime plans which envision our fleets and
forces engaged away from home waters. Soviet strategic, land-
attack (SliA) SLCMs, if deployed in platforms off our or
allied coasts, will impact upon deployment, development and
engagement planning as guided by the Maritime Strategy. Their
effect on Western SLOCs, port facilities, bases and threat to
interior continental strategic forces can be met by an
extended Maritime Strategy which promotes a measure of
coastal defense. Aspects for U.S. Naval interaction are the
current Maritime Defense Zones (MDZ) program, and the newer
Air Defense Initiative (ADI) . This investigation examines the
Soviet SLA-SLCM threat, a broader Maritime Strategy, and the
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE PROBLEM
The ability of the Soviet Union to threaten the contin-
ental United States with strategic weapons is not a new
threat, nor a radical departure from the current or
preceding superpower military postures. Two new Soviet
submarine-launched cruise-missiles though, the SS-NX-21 and
the SS-NX-24, bring the dimension of close-in attack on the
continental U.S. or the territory of our allies back into
the forefront of defense considerations for the U.S. and the
West, compared with existing strategic threats. These
systems are worthy of examination and study due their
potential impact on western strategy, planning and policy-
especially Maritime Strategy and its defense objective
component
.
Following the settlement of World War II, events such as
the division of Germany, radical political changes in
Greece, the foirmation of NATO, and military adventures in
Korea, prompted a reversal of U.S. passive worldly support
for more active assistance measures and defensive actions.
[Ref. 1] Meanwhile, between the superpowers and their
emerging bipolar spheres, from the inception of nuclear
weapons, the advent of ballistic missiles and the increased
accuracy of modernized guidance capabilities, grew the
thrust and parry of the strategic arms contest. With
stances and retreats due to differing abilities and weapon
systems, both nuclear and conventional, this competition has
continued to today. On the material side, technology has
set the pace for both of the powers, from early bombers and
rocket forces nurtured out of German wartime achievements,
into the electronic age with miniaturization and advanced
designs forging new tradeoffs for each side almost daily.
Most notable and impacting of modern technological progress
upon the military, has been the evolution of autonomous
weapon systems—those with sophisticated warhead designs,
enhanced range abilities and ever-improving accuracy and
lethality, advanced propulsion capabilities and the nature
of being separated from human control (in contrast to most
of the weapons of the last world war) . In this realm came
the ballistic missiles, of short, regional, intercontinental
and sea-launched variations, the missiles of the
fire-and-forget variety, and the multitude of operational
interfaces, support infrastructures and staging systems for
each.
Amidst this revolution of strategic and tactical
weaponry, evolved a tactically adroit but strategically
unwieldy foirm of robot weapon, the cruise-missile.
Competition in the strategic arms area has centered around
the capabilities of the superpowers to inflict strategic
damage upon each other through use of controlled, long-range
forms of weapons, wherein earlier the some-what vulnerable
air bomber had the human factor in its operational loop to
an extent satisfying moral needs for control of weapons of
mass-destruction. Multi-layered threat environments grew
and the invincibility of the manned-bomber forces
diminished, and the need arose for less-vulnerable
air-breathing weapons without potentially expendable human
operators. The cruise-missile, relegated to the form of
long range, guided projectile in tactical use, has come
again to the forefront of military employment, much as the
Nazi German strategists once utilized the V-1. Today the
cruise-missile is a lead system in the U.S. military
inventory, for our land, sea, and air forces.
Particular to this discussion, the cruise-missile
currently acts as a force multiplier, multi-role and multi-
mission weapon for the U.S. Navy [Ref. 2]. Its convent-
ional, nuclear, and anti-ship capabilities along with its
range, stealth and lethality characteristics have bolstered
the deterrent and forward defense abilities required in our
present Maritime Strategy. The West though, is not alone in
recognition of the potential usefulness of the cruise-
missile weapons system, and the recent design, development
and deployment of this form of weapon in a land-attack mode
by the Soviets is the concern of this investigation. Soviet
potential basing in a variety of submarines, possibly
deployed off Western nations' coastlines, raises new ASW
defense planning and policy questions. My research
addresses the role of the cruise-missile in the Soviet
military, the advent of the Soviet modern naval variants
capable of strategic land-attack missions and conjecture as
to their evolution, and the capabilities and the potential
impact those capabilities may allow the Soviets to effect on
the U.S. and the West.
Further, given a substantial realization of the exist-
ence of this form of threat, my investigation reflects on
the present U.S. Maritime strategy and how it can meet these
emerging Soviet SLCM capabilities. With respect to the
Maritime Strategy, the force posture of forward defense and
the SLCM driven requirement of CONUS defense must be review-
ed, and within this the aspect of the Maritime Defense
Zones. Also, the Air Defense Initiative (ADI) currently
under evaluation is relevant to the defensive requirements
necessary to meet a potential strategic land-attack (SLA)
submarine-launched cruise-missile (SLCM) threat as is
eL'.erging in the Soviets SS-NX-21 and SS-NX-24 systems.
The cruise-missile is once again a strategic element for
not only the United States in our TOMAHAWK, ALCM and GLCM
systems, but now also for the Soviets with the recognition
of the threat inherent in their recent SLA-SLCM weapons
systems evolutions. As such, it is a familiar and well used
weapons system with a rich historical past and now a more
ominous pretext for the future.
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Much as the cruise-missile has become a capable asset
for the global strategy of deterrence as practiced by the
United States and its allies, the weapon poses newly
unrecognized hazards for this nation depending on how it is
employed by our chief adversaries. An introduction to the
evolution of these two Soviet systems, with reflection upon
the Soviet thought processes behind their commitment to and
possible uses of strategic mission cruise-missiles, lays the
stage for a discussion of the possible military utility of
these two systems. Examining the technical characteristics
of the two Soviet systems follows next—both systems similar
yet dramatically capable of differing ends. Ominous of
these new systems is their ability to be carried to points
within range of the continental U.S. or near the shores of
our allies, and launched into our airspace where detection,
tracking, and countering is as difficult as with other
strategic threats. As the Soviets currently have the
largest fleet of attack submarines (291 total as of 1
January 1986 to the 119 of the U.S.; but a Warsaw Pact and
U.S.S.R. total of 296 to a NATO and U.S. total of 292!), it
is also necessary to examine the potential carriers of the
submarine-launched cruise-missiles (SLCMs) [Ref. 3].
A postulation of the differing forms of employment of
the SLCM threat will then be attempted based on the
groundwork of the systems potentials, and from the known and
applicable characteristics of Soviet strategy and tactics.
11
From this estimate conclusions and recommendations can be
put forward for (1) the implications on the U.S. Maritime
Strategy—the impact upon the existing Maritime Defense Zone
(MDZ) coastal defense planning and the main forward posture
pretext of the strategy aimed at meeting our maritime
related national security objectives, (2) the problem of an
analogous response role of Soviet employment, (3) the impact
on plans and interaction with our allies—especially in the
NATO/European theater, (4) what relevancy these weapons
systems hold for the on-going debate over the Navy's role
and level of involvement in the ADI program, and (5) the
dilemmas these two Soviet strategic land-attack cruise-
missiles bring to future arms-control.
The theme of this examination is to bring light on a new
form of an old Soviet threat—their sea-launched cruise-
missile—and highlight the possible rear-flanks ASW and
shore-line air-defense problems these SLCMs pose to the U.S.
and her allies in the strategically employed land-attack
variant. Near-coast and mid-ocean ASW become even tougher
problems when facing the newer, quieter Soviet submarines
and the strategic defense equation for the U.S. and its
allies is further complicated if the Soviets realize a true
SLA-SLCM operational deployed capability. Countering a
potential close-in strategic sub-based SLCM threat will
further task western maritime planning, and resources.
12
B. THREAT HISTORY
The cruise-missile has a rich past in global warfare
employment, and has its origins in the guided munitions
developed at the turn of the century. These developments
coincided with the early rocket propulsion work of
scientists such as Goddard and Von Braun. The onset of
World War II found the Nazi-Geirman work farthest ahead and
the V-I and V-2 weapons severely harassed the allies
throughout this conflict. Allied developments found foirm in
the glide bombs, which the U.S. Navy also employed. On a
large-size scale mirrored later by the Soviets, was the
"Weary-Willie" an guided unmanned B-17 plane loaded with
explosives. While variations abound, most notable was the
magnitude of the German V-1 "Buzz-bomb" threat during the
war period. The Germans utilized over 9000 of these against
the British-evidence of the ability to mass produce a weapon
once test and development had proven its usefulness. This
large-scale acquisition capability factor is also important
when postulating the potential magnitude of a Soviet SLCM
threat based on the Soviets demonstrated ability to mass
produce a weapon or weapon system.
German scientists solved the problems of electronic
remote control of guided weapons of WW II. Their advance-
ments included advanced guidance forms and target homing
systems which the Soviets later acquired. This evolutionary
history has relevance to the Soviet evolution of the
13
cruise-missile due to the large number of German technicians
and scientists along with materials and knowledge acquired
by the Stalin government at wars end. Guidance methods such
as TV and IR systems, or datalink prominent in later Soviet
weapons may have had their origins in German post-war
plunders
.
The post-war period saw Soviet recognition of the
American nuclear capability and U.S. utility of Naval
air-power forces—Soviet weapons system progress proved
oriented towards anti-carrier and strategic defense
missions. In 1947 the AS-1 "Kennel" air-to-surface (ASM)
missile debuted following research probably initiated prior
to wars end. Soviet ASM development was methodical and
paced, an RTD&E characteristic which has predominated Soviet
defense industry since. Simplicity, use of existing
sub-systems, and mission-specific technical features are
general characteristics that have emerged central to Soviet
military RTD&E. Soviet propulsion systems evolved from
subsonic centrifugal flow turbojets, to supersonic,
axial-flow engines, to MACH 2+ capable, liquid propellant
rockets of today's generation missiles. Soviet launching
and operational envelopes increased and system ranges
increased from near 500 Km for the SSN-12 series of
missiles, to approximately 3 000 Km for the two systems that
are the subject of this paper. Projections reveal the
potential for future sophisticated Soviet systems with
14
greater capabilities, which will continue to magnify
difficult defense problems for the West. [Ref. 4: pp.
428-432]
Soviet missile systems that developed following V7W II
were numerous and capable. Air and surface systems predom-
inated the Naval theater and strike mission platforms while
subsurface launched ballistic missiles grew in capability
and stature as a strategic system almost equal in importance
to the evolving Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF-ICBM forces)
.
Low-cost high-firepower platforms dominated the Krushchev
era of Naval forces first under Admiral Kuznetzov and then
under Gorshkov. Strategic defense being the primary focus,
advanced weapons programs produced systems such as the
SS-N-2 STYX and SS-N-1 SCRUBBER missiles, in addition to the
previously mentioned KENNEL. The SS-N-3 SHADDOCK missile
deployed in 1962 initially as an anti-ship system, but has
notoriety as the first Soviet sub-launched land-attack
capable cruise-missile system put into service. Initially
aboard the WHISKEY class SS's, later these missiles (capable
of over 400 Nm ranges against land targets with a nuclear
warhead), found service in JULIETT and ECHO I/II SSG(N)'s as
these subs came on line.
The anti-carrier mission soon paralleled that of
strategic defense in importance, and ICBMs assumed the
land-attack mission with the advent of the Soviet SRF forces
in the late fifties. SLBMs replaced SCLMs as the strategic
15
maritime weapons due to their increased controllability and
ranges. ECHO and JULIETT class subs assumed solely
anti-shipping roles. These platforms were followed by the
CHARLIE class SSGN subs with the SS-N-7 and SS-N-9
subsurface launched anti-ship missiles of 1967. The SS-N-12
missile was the 70 's follow-on to the SHADDOCK, with
deployment in the ECHO II class SSGNs. Again, improvements
in the aforementioned missiles were those of speed increases
from subsonic to supersonic, above to under-water launching,
and range improvements. Notably the land-attack variant of
the SHADDOCK, the SS-N-3C, of 1960, had a longer range than
its sister ASM, and was similar to the U.S. REGULUS missile.
These trends highlight continued Soviet submarine capability
emphasis and cruise-missile weapon system dominance, and
reveal cruise-missile evolution unhindered by external
global, political, economic or military changes.
Following the NATO response to the intermediate range
debate by deploying Pershing II/GLCMs in 1983, the Soviets
reacted with the deployment off the coast of the U.S. of an
SSGN during the winter of 1983/84. Though only a short
duration posting occurred, the potential and the political
willingness to promote an analogous response action was
clearly evident and sets the stage for a potential use of
the SS-NX-21 or follow-on SS-NX-24 sub-launched missiles in
a land-attack mode. The event suggests the reemergence of
16
remote, sub-based, land-attack threat employment in Soviet
political-military and strategic-tactical considerations.
Combining the cruise-missile characteristics of lowlevel
ingress, high-speed, lower radar signature (compared to a
strike bombers) , and payload flexibility with the covertness
and mobility of a submarine, produces a clearly advantageous
threat combination. Reflecting on the U.S. TOMAHAWK cruise-
missile weapons system, the U.S. Navy has exploited these
factors in deploying a cost-effective, force-multiplier
weapon. The use of conventional variants holds other pluses
which the U.S. could utilize if required such as the ability
to deploy sub-munitions, chemical or high-explosive
warheads. These characteristics would further enhance a
Soviet SLCM systems usefulness in limited scope conflicts.
The raid of April 1986, by the U.S. against Libya, is an
example of the potential application of non-nuclear
land-attack cruise-missiles. With the Soviet propensity for
intervention and commitment to other "socialist brothers"
[Ref. 5], the possibility of a use for the "Tomahawkski" is
evident [Ref. 6:p. 79].
C. SOVIET SLA-SLCM SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS
An examination of the threat, any threat, must also be
an in-depth look at the particulars of the system, both for
strengths and weaknesses. A knowledge of these particulars
also helps in evolving ASW counter-strategies and counter-
systems for the threat. The SS-NX-21 missile system appears
17
to have been conceived and committed to by the Soviets in
the 1970 's. U.S. estimates put initial operational
capability in 1984. Sea-based testing was conducted from a
modified VICTOR class SSN [Ref. 4:p. 431]. The SS-NX-21
system may have been an effort to match western technology
in the cruise-missile field, an effort of the 70 's well
publicized between companies such as Boeing and MacDonald-
Douglas. The political motivations for promoting and
authorizing such a developmental effort within the Soviet
defense industry are less clear, but the political leverage
factor of such a weapon is clear.
The Soviets had long lobbied against the West's Forward-
Based-Systems, then the Intermediate-range response systems
of the Pershing II/GLCM systems, as threatening to the
"Motherland" due to their differing view of 'strategic,' and
pushed for a complete ban on cruise-missiles with ranges
over 600 Km. The advent of a Soviet long-range cruise-
missile capability could easily be a push for an expendable
negotiations bargaining chip, a trade- of f item, in the
furtherance of this aim. The importance of the cruise-
missile issue is also reflected in the attention and effort
the Soviets have always devoted to their air defenses with
the advent of the GLCM and Tomahawk missile deployments.
With respect to Soviet military strategy, the advent of
modern SLCMs could be seen as the follow-on to SLBMs in the
often professed "Battle for the Land," the continued
18
all-important central focus of the Soviet military strategy
[Ref. 6:p. 10]. This factor is also relevant if the Soviets
are considering in anyway the future potential of an
effective strategic defense capability (SDI) on the part of
the U.S. Another factor in the military sense is the force
multiplier advantage of this sub-launched system. Weapons
load-out information is speculative in the West,
complicating Western defense planning in both the strategic
and tactical senses. The possibility of the SLCM being a
new theater level weapon is less likely due to the existence
of systems such as the GOLF II SSBs in the Baltic, along
with SS-20, and 23 missiles in Europe [Ref. 7:pp. 35-38].
The technical specifics of the SS-NX-21 missile are also
revealing and worth comparison to their counterpart, the
Tomahawk. Similarities include: launch capability from
standard torpedo tubes for both systems, with boosters and
turbofan sustaining engines, subsonic cruise speeds of
approximately 0.7 MACH, and digital Inertial Navigation
systems. Yet, the Soviet missile is expected to exceed the
U.S. in range by almost 200 NM, to the U.S. 1400 NM
capability. Like the U.S. model the Soviet one may utilize
inertial navigation with terrain-contour matching updating
(TERCOM) . Most important is the ability of the Soviet
Missile to accommodate their standard 53 cm torpedo tube.
This characteristic, like the versatility inherent in the
U.S. Tomahawk, allows for employment on numerous classes of
19
Soviet subs. The variety of capable platforms though is not
as cut-n-dry as this might indicate.
The SS-NX-24 clearly represents the incorporation of
both solutions to the problems and tactical inabilities of
the SS-NX-21 missile system and some changes due to
potentially different mission requirements. A speed in
excess of 2.0 M make this a tougher target for Western
air-defense than its smaller brother. Also the large size
of this weapon has not precluded a long-range capability.
However its size is a factor in radar-cross section with
regard to detection. A major point with this system is the
possibility for incorporation of newer propulsive
technologies into its construction. With a possible
multi-function warhead, the known available design of this
high-speed system seems ideal to defeat current Western
air-defense schemes for slower flying air-breathing threats,
and a strategic and theater attack role seems possible along
with the other potential missions of both weapons systems.
The SS-NX-24 had an estimated IOC of late 1986. With
sea-based test firing in progress, the new SSGN test
platform indicates a potentially strategic role in future
Soviet planning, possibly as a system alternative to SLBMs
if a true SDI defense capability is realized by the West, or
if negotiations restrict SSBNs.
20
D. MISSILE CARRYING PLATFORMS
The SS-NX-24 missile has evolved outside those varied
characteristics of compatibility and inter-operability which
the SS-NX-21 has. As a different missile a different
platform was required and the result was a modified YANKEE
SSBN. As with the SS-NX-21 system, command and control,
electronic support, fire-control systems and logistical
problems specific to this new missile will require assoc-
iated support and fleet accommodations. The use of the
large hull of an SSBN also is indicative of the size of
these missiles, no longer in the torpedo-tube size category!
The SS-NX-24 may be the future, follow-on and strategic
force base missile system, and as YANKEE class SSBNs are
retired from the strategic arsenal, they may retain useful-
ness as converted strategic SLCM platforms.
In general, carriers of the two aforementioned missile
systems require extremely modern fire-control systems and
command and control capabilities. In the test at-sea shots
of the SS-NX-21 a modified VICTOR SSN was employed as the
firing platform, with noted equipment modifications and
attachments to its external hull. These additions could
also signal additional C-^ requirements for the missile
system. Another factor, often echoed by U.S. submariners,
is the fact that carrying these weapons displaces the
load-out of conventional torpedoes the submarine can carry,
their most vital ASW weapon. This tradeoff was accounted
21
for with U.S.-L.A. class SSN hull modifications for external
Tomahawk mounting, but similar platform modifications are
only employed on the OSCAR for SS-N-19 ASMs. Thus a
potential mission degradation is possible depending on the
load-out of dedicated land-attack force submarines.
The VICTOR use as the initial firing unit also signals
possible inadequacy of support systems in older SSNs.
Another possibility is the capability to fire SS-NX-21s from
53cm. torpedo tubes on surface vessels—however no
indications of that ability or intent were uncovered in this
study. A reasonable assumption is then that only the
Soviet's most modern SSNs, those most sophisticated, will be
capable of the requirements of the SS-N-21 missile system.
These include the other VICTOR units of earlier classes if
modified, the recent SSNs—the SIERRA class successors to
the VICTOR line, and the AKULA class SSNs. OSCAR class
SSGNs, converted YANKEE former SSBNs, and SSs as well as
other 53 cm tube capable vessels are also candidates.
Soviet Naval force structure intentions were unknowii via the
level of this study, and intentions as to deployment of the
"tomahawkski" are unclear. If the missile system is used as
a replacement to SLBM retirees under current or future SALT
negotiations, other more strategically capable subs may be
utilized. Should a conventional power-projection
land-attack force be the Soviet aim the role may fall to
newer SSNs with the best C-^ abilities, and best covert
22
capabilities. A reserve SLCM nuclear force or a submarine
nuclear war-fighting force are also possible employment
methods
.
Correspondingly more logistical support will be required
for a force sporting the SS-NX-21, and similar findings are
evident for the possible future YANKEE-MOD SS-NX-24
carriers. This is not as large a problem for shore-based
facilities, but more so, for those SSN support elements such
as tenders at remote anchorages and foreign ports.
E. POTENTIAL EMPLOYMENT
In assessing the potential of these weapon systems, some
new aspects deserve mention along with the aforementioned
political, strategic and military considerations. The
platform weapons load-out characteristics for the SS-NX-21
system are particularly important: a high number of weapons
per platform/small force size—or a low number of weapons
per platform/large force size are possibilities. Another
point concerning Soviet planned utilization is the aspect of
political leverage inherent in a demonstrated SLCM capabil-
ity with respect to desired cruise-missile limitations that
the Soviets have pursued in arms limitations and reduction
negotiations. A proven capability to match the Western
intermediate range responses in Europe and also threaten
NATO-Europe with a future cruise-missile threat may
influence the Western-Europe members of NATO in favor of
elimination or restriction, gravely impacting the currently
23
deployed GLCM forces, and even more so the deployed U.S.
Naval Tomahawk assets. Current range projections for both
the SS-NX-21 and SS-NX-24 place the rim of most NATO member
nations at risk, both for theater operations if conventional
payloads were utilized, and for strategic offensive and
reserve retaliatory ability with nuclear payloads. A key
element is the invulnerability of the low-flying cruise-
missile to detection, tracking and defense as compared to
other air-breathing flyers. Ingress at levels of several
hundred feet could exploit weaknesses in both European and
U.S. coastal early warning and surveillance systems. This
factor lends credence to the threat of future employment of
Soviet SLCMs in an reactionary response role. [Ref. 8:p.
21]
In the short term, these weapons provide an immediate
capability to tactically and strategically threaten any
Western foe from a secure platform far removed from the
continental Soviet Union. This aspect could also be
exploited against other smaller or neutral nations or third
world nations in a political and/or military sense.
Reactive Western requirements for surveillance, detection
and coastal defense are products of this potential Soviet
SLCM strategic employment. Similar requirements for
adequate force levels for response to a larger threat close
to Western shores can relegate the initiative into the grasp
of Soviet military planners, an element of their
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Clausewitzian based naval theory well desired, and put the
West in a response and reaction rather than initiator mode
which our Maritime Strategy envisions. The missions in the
West's maritime strategy of greatest importance in
deterrence and in war-fighting of SLOC maintenance and of
providing a means of horizontal escalation through
power-projection are threatened by the development of these
SLCM systems. SLOC termini at both the origin and receiving
points fall into fire-zones from these weapons systems if
deployed in the Baltic, western Atlantic, Mediterranean,
Norwegian, or western Pacific ocean theaters, even when
launched from within Soviet bastions! These systems also
give the Soviet Navy the ability to field an escalatory card
in a potential superpower conflict through horizontal
escalation management of their own.
As the U.S. Navy theorizes its ability to forward deploy
in conflict, and to even strike at Soviet shore-based
facilities and strategic support bases if required, so the
potential Soviet SLCM employment provides Soviet planners
with the capability to target U.S. CONUS and Western
European NATO bases. Attacks on Western airlift staging
areas, port facilities, command and control points or strat-
egic bases would bring a new dimension to planned U.S.
military action and response not experienced since the Pearl
Harbor attack of World War II. The newer SS-NX-24 system
has the evolutionary potential for greater ranges than
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estimated from sources cited here, clearly making it a
candidate as a strategic replacement weapon.
With technological improvements, such as in accuracy
(CEP) , these and follow-on SLCM generations can shift
strategic defense requirements from the tradition of
countering an exoatmospheric threat to one of meeting a low-
flying, fast-moving threat. An option for the SS-NX-24 and
follow-on SLCMs is the incorporation of penetration aids
and/or countermeasures , allowing more efficient ingress to
targets that may be strategically defended and against
current and future air defense elements of the West. These
are but some of the postulated potential employment
considerations for the two SLCM systems under examination,
and others less easily visible probably exist. Countering a
new Soviet SLCM Land-Attack threat as posed here creates
planning problems for both the U.S. and our allies.
F. THE DILEMMAS POSED
As the U.S. Maritime Strategy of today is a guiding
document for our Naval planning, procurement, and deployment
in the future, it makes sense that it should accommodate the
broad spectrum of threats against which the Navy may have to
venture "in harms' way." The Submarine-Launched Land-Attack
Cruise-Missiles as are being put forth by the Soviets now
bring a new ASW and air-defense considerations in threat
assessment to our Naval force planning and to our
interactive coordination with our NATO and Pacific theater
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allies. Should the U.S. Navy take a strong or weak position
on the CONUS air-defense issue (ADI) and what extent should
the requisite ASW response to this new SLCM threat impact
our forward operations based deterrent planning? Is the
current Maritime Defense Zone planning and operations
doctrine sufficient to cope with a potentially operational
Soviet SLA-SLCM system today, and if not, what improvements
in this very important aspect of the defense of this nation
are required?
Also, given the potential of the Soviet use of the SLCM
as a hidden ace in negotiations, what position should the
West take on these systems and what particular position
should the U.S. Navy present given our present strength of
Tomahawk systems and their planned growth? Clearly the
defense against Cruise Missiles, from the sea-launched (and
also air-launched systems) , is a joint service tactical
problem. Yet, plans for dedicated air defense, and efforts
in the coastal-defense and open-ocean ASW missions these
threats imply should be reflected to a larger extent in our
Maritime Strategy, the naval planning component of our
National Security Strategy. Hopefully, a better
understanding of this threat will prompt reflection on these
and related issues, as the Cruise-Missile threat is here to
stay, for the U.S. Navy, and now for the Soviets as well!
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II. SOVIET MILITARY ACQUISITION AND THEIR SLCMS
A. AN OVERVIEW
Evaluating the possible motives and rationale for the
Soviets development, testing and potential deployment of
strategic land-attack submarine-launched cruise-missiles
requires a thorough understanding of the organizational
framework which guides Soviet military hardware endeavors.
This, along with an understanding of the internal political,
and external geopolitical competition and technological
events and issues which confront Soviet political and
military leaders and demand decisions and courses of action
of those leaders, can then be applied to the advent of the
innovation and material/ funding commitment which the Soviets
have undertook in two of their recent missile systems
acquisitions—the SS-NX-21 and the SS-NX-24 submarine-
launched cruise-missiles (SLCMs)
.
To merely examine the Western academic Js.nov\^ledge of the
Soviet party-military structure would be sufficient for the
placement of the events in a timeline of the evolution of a
missile system, but would reveal little appreciation of the
motivations and intentions behind the decisions leading to
the inception of the system. Rather, this basic structural
understanding should be supplemented with a review of
related literature and declaratory statements of Soviet
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political/military origin as much as is possible, to give
credibility to and lend evidence to any conjectures made as
to the topic at hand—the intentions of Soviet leadership in
creating a strategic land-attack (SLA) cruise-missile
program, and the intentions for the future employment or
deployment of these systems.
On one hand, the theoretical structure behind Soviet
military acquisition decisions has already been debated and
resolved in the West, to reach a comfortable position on the
probable flow of ideas and actions. This framework provides
a context for understanding the evolution of military
equipment developmental policy, the same evolution that the
SLA-SLCM systems under scrutiny must have undergone.
In Western understanding, the MILITARY SCIENCE category
of MILITARY THOUGHT, is the domain of the professional
military officers, and is the realm of empirical, concrete
and palatable thoughts and ideas of the military profession.
This precise and well-defined domain is paralleled by and
subservient to the MILITARY DOCTRINE category of MILITARY
THOUGHT, MILITARY DOCTRINE being the flow of ideas coming
from the political leadership on issues and topics of
military and national defense nature, which provide the
operating orders for the military professionals to derive
applicable tenets of MILITARY SCIENCE from. Thus, the
statements and literature of interest for deriving infor-
mation about the evolution of the Soviet SLCM systems must
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fall within these two broad catagories of Soviet military
thought—MILITARY DOCTRINE and MILITARY SCIENCE. And behind
these catagories of military thought, lies the ideological
base of the Soviet government, Soviet history, and Soviet
geopolitical and social cultural characteristics.
B. WEAPONS SYSTEM ACQUISITION PHYSIOLOGY
The Soviet organizational structure is pronounced and
defined, as known in the West, and the applicable portions
of the party/state structure for evolving a SLCM program
under the military weapons acquisition process, begins with
the Defense Council and its chairman. This body,
subservient to both the Central Party Politburo and the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, executes defense program
decisions following consideration (and if necessary
modification) and approval based on perceptions of MILITARY
SCIENCE in congruence with the MILITARY DOCTRINE approved
and promoted by the party and state. Thus the decisions for
the SS-NX-21 and SS-NX-24 SLA-SLCM cruise-missile variants
were probably debated first at this military/political level
with other strategic weapons programs being planned for the
future in considerations of long-range budget allocations.
Considering the time for the execution of the U.S.
cruise-missile program, following Congressional R&D funding
approval in 1972 to operational status in the early
eighties, a ten to fifteen year evolution period can be
advanced for the similar Soviet cruise-missile programs.
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This premise would place inception of the Soviet SLA-SLCM
programs in the very early 1970 's. Also, this premise
reflects the importance of the commitment to the SLA-SLCM
systems as a major military hardware expenditure that had
potential impact across several five-year economic plans for
the Soviets.
From the Defense Council, through the Council of
Ministers, the implementation of the cruise-missile programs
fell to the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) with party
oversight probable through the Central Committee Defense
Industry Department and programs' execution under the
Defense Industrial Ministries and Ministry of Defense (MOD)
.
Weapons procurement is a prime responsibility of the MOD in
its management of the Soviet Armed Forces development. The
cruise-missile programs acquisition management would likely
fall to the Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments if the
program was considered a general weapon, or under the Deputy
Minister for Strategic Rocket Forces if the intent of the
SLA-SLCM systems was strictly "strategic". The General
Staff supports the MOD in this role, by evaluating appli-
cations for technology, and therefore probably engaged in
deliberations on the military utility of the cruise-missile
systems [Ref . 9] . Input to the General Staff for considera-
tions on the general cruise-missile programs came from the
individual services departments dealing with weapons systems
development, and with the cruise-missile programs having
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derivatives in the ground-launched, air-launched, and
submarine-launched forms, a respective services deputy CinC
in charge of weapons or systems would manage these R&D
initiatives, and follow-on development and deployment
programs
.
The individual services are each led by a Deputy
Minister of Defense [Ref. 10:p. 133]. As the systems under
consideration here are naval (although dual in their
breeding because they also are undoubtedly land-attack and
therefore strategic in character) , the train of thought and
action in the Naval hierarchy is the next level in following
the decision flow. Under the Deputy Minister of Defense,
Commander in Chief-Admiral of the Fleet V.N. Chernavin, fall
the major naval commands of the five fleets, each with their
respective admiral, and the departmental Deputy CinC's of
the Soviet Navy. Possibly a key individual, instrumental in
executing these SLA-SLCM programs is the Deputy CinC of the
Soviet Navy for Shipbuilding and Armaments-Engineer Admiral
P.G. Kotov. [Ref. 7: p. 12; Ref. 4:p. 15]
Thus, a path may be followed in the cruise-missile
programs decisions of the political/military hierarchy:
from the General Secretary and Commander-in-Chief of the
Soviet Armed Forces, M. Gorbachev, through the control and
decision chain of the Supreme High Command of the armed
forces and General Staff executors wherein the original
decision to initiate the missile system programs was
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probably conceived. This groundwork provides the positions
and key personnel to look to for revealing information and
insight, in their overt commentary and dialogue, and in
substratum within written and oral statements and
official/military publications, indications of the original
intentions and current objectives regarding the SLCM
systems
.
The second element of the decision-making process as
applied to the Soviet Cruise-missile programs and specific-
ally the SLA-SLCM systems being considered here, is the
Soviet train of thought in the evaluation process. With the
aforementioned organizational framework, if their functional
thought process is also applied to the SLA-SLCM systems
evolution, a more complete guide exists within which the
statements and written literature of the Soviet leadership
can be evaluated, and the past motivations and future
intentions for the SLA-SLCM systems may be predicted.
This is the other half of the weapons decisionmaking and
acquisition process which should have molded the Soviet SLCM
variant of the cruise-missile program, and can be considered
the functional process behind most any Soviet major weapons
acquisition. This portion of the process may be seen as
being comprised of three main phases separated by two major
decision points, and this systematic process can probably be
applied to any major Soviet weapons program decision chain
[Ref . 11] . Concept definition and validation comprise the
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first phase of the process, in which the determination is
made of the need for the particular military capability, and
(specific to the logic of the Soviet process) the substan-
tiation of the tactical and technical requirements to be
placed on the proposed system occurs.
Based on the organizational structure previously
mentioned in the political/military decisionmaking
hierarchy, this first phase is further subdivided into three
levels— in the first, the particular service branch
armaments directorate probably formulated the tactical and
technical requirements for the SLCM systems and their
anticipated costs are calculated. For these SLCM systems
this too was probably done under the oversight of Engineer
Admiral P.G. Kotov along with related fleet elements and the
Main Naval Staff.
In the second level of the first functional phase,
evaluating decisions concerning alternate weapons configur-
ations or totally alternate armament forms are made, for the
cruise-missile program in total, probably under the
direction of the Soviet High Command Deputy Minister for
Armaments (presently Army General V. M. Shabanov) . Based on
this expectation in the Western understanding of a Soviet
consideration of alternates, it is presumable that the
Soviet leadership had, by this point in the decisionmaking
process, determined some preliminary national security
objectives for the SLA cruise-missile programs overall, and
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within the individual services considered which mission
criteria the systems could or desirably should meet.
For the Soviet Navy under Admiral of the Fleet Cher-
navin, this phase of evaluating the specific potential
Soviet Naval strategic utility of SLA-SLCMs, would include
evaluations of specific elements of the navy missions (i.e.,
the strike against the shore or anti-SLOC) which the
SLA-SLCM systems could achieve in the 1980 's
—
given that
these decisions were being made in the early 70 's.
The third level in the functional decisionmaking chain
is believed to consist of an impact assessment by the
Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) . This agency (headed
by the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, L.V.
Smirnov as of 1979) [Ref. 10:p. 294], would evaluate the
effect of the proposed weapons systems upon the national
economy, and effected military and civilian programs.
Interaction with the state planning agency, the Government
Planning Committee (GOSPLAN) and other sub-committees or
sub-agencies such as the State committee on Science and
Technology (responsible for ensuring the defense industries
acquire the latest innovations from the science fields)
would also occur at this level. [Ref. 10 :p. 295]
Weapons effectiveness models are applied in this portion
of the functional process, including parametric cost models
and cost estimates based on program life-cycle costs such as
R&D expenses, production and operational/maintenance funding
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requirements. This three tier systematic process of thought
about the proposed weapons systems culminates in decisions
resulting with project acceptance and initial leadership and
funding commitment to the program. This end-point is the
first major decision step for any major weapons endeavor in
the Soviet military development process. The initial estim-
ates produced in this phase are applied by sub-committees
and ministries such as GOSPLAN or sub-divisions of the VPK
to determine the impact of the new program (s) on the
national economy.
The next phase in this functional process is the
full-scale development phase consisting of resolution of the
weapons system concepts, the design and construction of
prototype weapons and their eventual test and evaluation.
This sub-element of the functional evolution process would
comprise the basic research and application of that research
to achieve a program capable of the aforementioned tactical
and technical requirements of the weapon system (s) . Here
too, the fundamental assumption to be drawn is that the
guiding considerations for the Soviet decisionmakers must
rest on achieving some military usefulness with the new
system, and therefore inherent in the decisions and system
promotions by the service elements are specific military
utility goals which the political/military leadership
believe the new weapon system (s) can meet. If these
timeline suppositions are correct concerning the duration of
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the SLA-SLCM programs evolution, these goals were resolved
in the late 1970 's period. This concept of underlying
utility desires will be revisited later.
At the conclusion of this second functional phase, the
second major decision step in the acquisition process
occurs. Here, the leadership must consider the commitment
to mass production of the weapons or weapons systems. The
suitability of series production of the system would come
under scrutiny at this junction, along with considerations
of reevaluated cost expectations due to variations in
program subsystems costs, or due to changes in basic
requirements the program was to originally meet. Here the
emphasis is on the economic feasibility of the program (s)
,
based on Soviet production cost modeling by industrial
planners tasked with mass-producing the system (s)
.
Cruise-missile program and specifically SLA-SLCM systems
costs up to that point—the cost/performance data
accumulated, any reallocation of funds which might be
required, and the detailed prediction of the total program
costs through the operational functional stage are
considered factors.
Here, at the juncture where commitment to production and
incumbent demands on the Soviet national economy are incur-
red, begins the third and final phase of the acquisition
process. This phase includes the series production of the
weapon or system, the construction of installations and
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ancillary equipment delivery (probably the integration into
C-^I networks and logistics networks and support subsystems)
,
arming of the systems (with respect to their strategic
control or integration into combined arms plans) , and
initial operational capability attainment.
Another path of information worth examining on the
evolution of Soviet SLA-SLCM intentions is the underlying
Soviet hierarchy focus on forces missions and the match-up
of cruise-missile characteristics with missions of a
particular branch or branches of the Soviet Armed forces.
For the Soviet Navy, the dilemma is with the assignment of
the SLA-SLCM program capabilities to a solely strategic
control and interaction, or to a regional system or a
combination of both. With this underlying focus naturally
comes an evaluation of military writings and documentation
along with publications translated in the West, for tie-ins
of objectives or mission elements with the capabilities of
the SLCMs.
C. SLA-SLCM DECLARATORY EVIDENCE AND OPERATIONAL
RELATIONSHIPS
Stepping off from the depicted procedural process in
Soviet weapons acquisition cecisionmaking, an analysis of
the related military thought literature and of the Soviet
RTD&E and the defense production process (with emphasis on
Naval missiles) may yield further indications and insight
into the rationale behind the SLA-SLCM program. Further, a
38
look at the way in which Soviet military leadership views
Naval mission priorities can establish a judgment basis for
their delegation of the SLA-SLCM capability in present and
future force structures. A review of the changes and
evolution of the Soviet Navy over the past twenty-five years
is not applicable here, and has already been treated in
depth in other research, save to note the major shifts
initiated by doctrinal events such as the Breshnev Doctrine,
or by leadership directions—namely those of Admiral
Gorshkov, or by new equipment programs such as the convent-
ional large aircraft carrier currently being fitted-out.
What is required is a look at the RTD&E process under
which the SLCM systems would fall, and the similarities and
differences between conventional and strategic weapons
design and production evolution. Any agreements or
disagreements between the known events of the SLCM programs
and other Strategic weapons developmental programs may
provide valuable program evolution linkage, and therefore
symmetry in intention or potential use reasoning by the
Soviet leadership.
Then, upon this structural basis and process evaluation,
differing written and declaratory statements by military
leadership can be interpreted and examined to determine
potential tendencies and inclinations of the leadership with
regard to the placement of SLA-SLCM systems within the Naval
forces organization. Another avenue of linkage between
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these new SLA-SLCM systems, the Soviet Navy, and their
intended use, may be revealed if interpretations of known
SLCM evolutionary events are also in agreement with the
postulated Soviet RTD&E organization processes. Therefore,
several paths which may provide indications of intent or
evidence of planned use of the SLA-SLCM systems are the
writings of senior Naval leaders for reflections of this
leadership regarding strategic aims and military objectives,
military documentation on hardware and developmental events,
and analysis of trends and cyclic conditions in past weapons
systems which may have similarities in the known SLCM
developments
.
Moving on to evaluating differing Soviet sources for
evidence of intentions on their SLA-SLCM systems, an
estimation of the possible course the Soviet leadership has
charted for the SS-NX-21 and SS-NX-24 SLA-SLCMs may lie in
past anci recent discussions of naval missions, mission
priorities, threat assessments and perceptions, analysis of
Western cruise-missiles (specifically US Tomahawk)
development and deployment, along with technological
advances and changing geopolitical situations. The focus
here is on examining some Soviet generated literature, by
Naval leaders such as the past and most influential Soviet
Naval Commander in Chief, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet
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Union, and now retired S.G. Gorshkov-^, and the present
Soviet Naval CinC, Admiral of the Fleet, V. N. Chernavin.
For the purposes of this study, Soviet journals most
relevant to the tracking of progress and thought about the
Soviet SLA-SLCM programs include Morskov Sbornik (Naval
Digest)^, and the monthly journal Soviet Monthly Review .
Admiral Gorshkov contributed greatly in writing as well as
in practice, via his book The Sea Power of the State ,
originally published in Russian in 1976 and later translated
into English in 1979. [Ref. 12]
Reviewing the missions assigned to the Soviet Navy is a
prime starting point due to the normally operational slant
(i.e., their technical and tactical requirements) on Soviet
Weapons programs processes and acquisition decisions.
Western perceptions of the probable mission catagories for
Soviet Naval forces have been treated in depth in other
works, with Western official evaluation designating six
basic missions [Ref. 13]. Of these six predicted main tasks
evaluated in the West, the categories of (1) operations
against the Shore and (2) anti-enemy sea-lines of
^Admiral Chernavin apparently took-over the position as
Chief of the Soviet Navy and as a Deputy Minister of Defense
in early December, 1985. Several sources recorded the
retirement of Admiral Gorshkov, including Janes Defense








^Morskov Sbornik . Soviet Naval Digest, Selected
Translations, by the Naval Intelligence Command, Washington,
D.C.
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communication operations [anti-SLOC] , seem the most likely-
candidates for employment of a weapons program with
characteristics like those of the SLA-SLCM programs. Adm.
Gorshkov addresses these very points in his book, especially
the efforts he indicates should be devoted to sea-lines-of-
communications, which he terms the "conflict on sea
communications." In reviewing the characteristics of modern
fleets as he interpreted them, Adm. Gorshkov cites his
belief in the preeminence of operations against the shore
—
"Today, the dominant role (compared to that of fleets in
securing dominance of the sea) has been assumed by operat-
ions of the fleet against the shore"—which he states is
directly responsible for fleet development and evolution of
naval art. [Ref. 12:pp. 214,221,276]
Further, Western analysts have evaluated a renewed
emphasis on the Soviet use of naval forces for power-pro-
jection in third world arenas, probably in countering what
the Soviet leadership termed "local wars . . . waged by the
Imperialist states," and Gorshkov expounds on the Naval role
in this action citing their enormous contribution:
The operations of the fleets in local wars bring
the fleets in local wars bring the solution of tasks
into the sphere of 'fleet against the shore.' [Ref. 12:
p. 214]
Thus, Adm. Gorshkov sums up his analysis of his Soviet
fleets and one of their purposes touching on what Western
evaluators also acknowledge as primary objectives for the
uses of Soviet naval power. His analysis in his historical
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naval text from the Soviet leaders view-point also presents
an in-depth analysis of maritime military events and
situations of World War II and their relationship to naval
situations today. He presents a recognition, although often
behind stale ideological rhetoric, of the early significance
of the wartime flow of men and material across the Atlantic,
termed the "basic communications of NATO ... to its main
arsenal the United States". [Ref. 12: pp. 12,28]
His analysis included the actions of fleets in WW II
"being the struggle for sea communications aimed at
undermining the military-economic potential of the enemies.
. .", and specifically focused on the anti-SLOC efforts of
German submarines noting several factors which Soviet
planners possibly have incorporated into the conducting of
future conflicts.-^ Notably, Adm. Gorshkov specified a
quantified estimate of merchant shipping losses in the war
effort for WW II,'^ and went on to criticize the German
failure to interdict the Allies, noting an "imbalance of the
^Adm. Gorshkov also notes the importance of operations
against an enemy's sea communications in his considerations
on Naval Art, see S.G. Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State ,
p. 221.
"^Adm. Gorshkov questions the use of submarines in
combating enemy shipping, and cites figures here on Allied
merchant shipping losses and German submarine losses quoting
other Soviet authors, L.M. Yeremeyev and A. P. Shergin.
Specifically, the Soviet source depicts the loss of approx-
imately 14.6 million gross tons and 2830 vessels for the
allies. These figures are credible given estimates for
merchant vessel losses of 2753 and approximately 14.5
million tons in an American post-war ASW report.
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German fleet . . . turning the fleet into a narrowly-
specialized force and limiting its use merely to operations
on the enemy's communications, [being a] basic cause of the
defeat of the German fleet in the Battle of the Atlantic."
[Ref. 12: p. 119; Ref. 14] Adm. Gorshkov pursues this attack
stating the imbalance did not allow for effective use in
countering the "strike forces, or against the shore. ..."
[Ref. 14]
Thus Adm. Gorshkov, as the leading Soviet Naval officer
during the period of the inception of the SLA-SLCM programs,
has evidently recognized in thought the need for operations
not only of the German 'U-Boat' variety to negate enemy
shipping in wartime, but also the applicability of the use
of strikes from the sea against an enemy. This view was
probably entrenched in Soviet naval planning during his
tenure, and would therefore motivate applications of sea
based cruise-missiles as they became technologically
feasible.
The element of strike warfare is also considered by Adm.
Gorshkov in depth in his work. This touches on the
applications of naval forces in the aforementioned roles,
not only in a strategic-conventional sense, but also in the
strategic-nuclear realm. As the potential employment of
nuclear forces at sea has been a major consideration for the
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Soviets,^ the likelihood of applicability for SLA-SLCMs in
this role is great. Adm. Gorshkov provides insight into the
Soviet Naval leadership viewpoint on the importance of the
combining of missiles and submarines, and noted the
evolution of sub-based missile along two routes—those of
the long-range ballistic variety and those capable of
"hitting large surface ships and for destroying land
objectives." [Ref. 12 :p. 205]
Clearly this tract of thought indicates the tendency in
the Admirals' mind (and probably that of those planners
serving under him) toward employment of submarine-based
missiles, apart from SLBMs, in strikes against the shore,
and reflect a potential rationale for the early Soviet
desires for SLA-SLCMs.^ The ties between strikes from the
^The attention of the Soviet strategic military
planning to nuclear conflict at sea has been treated in
detail by many different authors. Most notable of these
examinations is James J. Tritten, Soviet Naval Forces and
Nuclear Warfare . (Boulder: Westview Press, 198 6) , and Gordon
H. McCormick and Mark E. Miller, "American Seapower at Risk:
Nuclear Weapons in Soviet Naval Planning", in ORBIS, Summer
1981. A pessimistic but broad ranging examination of the US
naval attention to the possibility of nuclear conflict at
sea is Desmond Ball's "Nuclear War at Sea", in International
Security . Vol. 10., No. 3., Winter 1985-86, while a more
articulate and realistic call to US naval nuclear strategic
planning is "The Nuclear Maritime Strategy" by CAPT. L. F.
Brooks, USN, in US Naval Institute's Proceedings . April 1987,
^The emphasis here is on Gorshkov 's theoretical
recognition of the potential future employment of submarine
launched guided missiles against shore targets. Also, in
this particular translation, this point in gorshkov ' s text
is a corrected aberation from other translations of the same
work. See James J. Tritten, Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear
Warfare . (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), p. 50n2.
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sea against an enemy's military-economic potential, and the
manner in which nuclear weapons have contributed to the
increased importance of operations against the shore is
another focus in Gorshkov's work. In his discussions of
post-war development of the Soviet Fleets, he elaborates on
both the changes missiles have brought to the structure of
his naval forces, and defines the 'modern' goals of conflict
at sea:
When the main weapon of the fleet became missiles of
different combat classes, this enabled it [the Soviet
fleet] to dispense with traditional criteria of deter-
mining the strengths of the groupings of forces at
sea. [Ref. 12:p. 211]
And Gorshkov pursues these aspects even further saying
".
. . the final goals of armed conflict at sea remain the
same: crushing the enemy, destroying his life force and
material resources {his ships and crews, and stores of
weapons or shore objectives} within reach of modern means of
attack from the oceans" [Ref. 12:p. 211]. Another example
of this emphasis on the turn of Soviet thinking of naval
actions from fleet-fleet action to fleet-shore action is
reflected in the priority and results Gorshkov sees in shore
strikes— ". . . successful operations of the fleet against
the shore brought a better result than the operations of
fleet against fleet" and in his reflections of the 'strike'
aspect of operations wherein he claims the strategic focus
of strike actions and reflects on the potential of strike
tactics to attain the objective of disrupting the
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"military-economic potential of an enemy" and occurring in a
form of actions "from enormous distances and different
directions.
"
By this the Admiral may be largely referring to the
potential of SLBM forces, but the following caveat he
attaches in his discussion sheds a different light on the
emphasis. Gorshkov goes on to cite the necessity of unified
action in naval operations he derived earlier in his
analysis of the failings of the German naval forces, but
also mentions at this point in his examination the potential
for "... independent and even single-act operation of a
single weapons carrier. . ." evidencing his belief in the
potential for single unit operations which are possible with
a SLA-SLCM carrier or a small force of submarines equipped
with SLCMs. Further, he concludes his discussion of strike
operations as a problem of 'Naval Art, ' commenting that
"strategic, operational and tactical objectives can be
reached by strikes ... by submarines on land targets
. .
.
" and indicates future developmental forces evolution
and associated thought in this area. [Ref. 12 :p. 224]
Inference may lead to opinion that the SLA-SLCM program
may have been only a shadow behind these thoughts of the
Soviet naval leader. However, with the US beginning its
cruise-missile program at the time, and with the possibility
that the emerging Soviet cruise-missile program would have
had evolving technical and tactical requirements in the
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writings, the clear possibility exists that the Soviet
emphasis and rationale for their SLA-SLCM progran. was
centered around this leaders military thoughts.
These elements of strategic strike, of submarine-based
missile operations against the shore-based military-economic
targets of an enemy, and of operations of the Soviet navy
against the enemy's sea-communications by actions against
the enemy's shore related installations are clearly met in
the potential of the system with characteristics of the
Soviet SLA-SLCM programs.
Adm. Gorshkov noted the radical change which missile
weaponry brought to the submarine forces in post-WW II
developments, citing their impact on force structure, on
mission effectiveness, and on the ability of the Soviet
states forces in meeting their required objectives of
countering US carrier forces and in effecting "strikes
against the shore". Examples of this train of thought in
dated Soviet naval hardware are the early Soviet probable
land-attack variants of the SSN-3 SHADDOCK missile system,^
and the later use of this systems inferred capability in
^US analysis of the purpose of the SHADDOCK missile
centered on its strategic land-attack potential while the
possibility that the system was strictly a anti-ship missile
existed. A detailed unclassified review of this and the
entire Soviet land-attack cruise-missile program is Joel
Wit's "Soviet Cruise Missiles," in the International
Institute for Strategic Studies SURVIVAL, November/December
1983.
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actions such as the probable positioning of the Soviet SSGN
submarines off the US coasts in response to the US/NATO
deployment of Pershing II and Ground-launched
Cruise-Missiles in the western European theater in 1983.^
This 'analogous response' rationale will be addressed later.
Arising from this information is the question of why the
Soviets shed their interest in land-attack cruise-missiles
of the late fifties/early sixties? Evidently, the momentum
of the ascent of the SRF (Strategic Rocket Forces) from 1957
on was paralleled by the evolution and rising importance of
SLBMs and SSBN submarines. Notably, the US also was
pressing on with our Poseidon SLBM missile program and
abandoned our REGULUS submarine-launched cruise-missile
program in the same time frame. However, the Soviets merely
truncated the land-attack variant of their cruise-missile
naval weapons development and acquisition, but pressed on
with and even emphasized the role of cruise-missiles in the
surface-to-surface mode and air-to-surface mode (sub-to-
ship, ship-to-ship, and air-to-ship) and later in the
sixties with the subsurface-to-surface capability (the
CHARLIE class SSGN with its SSN-7 and SSN-9 missiles)
.
^A discussion of the Soviet political motivations,
toward a submarine and even a non-SLBM force deployment off
US coastlines, in response to the modernization of strategic
forces in Europe with an 'analogous' response is given in J.
Wits' "Soviet Cruise Missiles" in IISS SURVIVAL . Nov/Dec
1983, pp. 254-255.
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The point here is the cruise missile programs were
redirected in the Soviet military programs while the US
largely executed a hiatus of our own cruise missile employ-
ment until the advent of the HARPOON and TOMAHAWK programs
in the seventies. Therefore, the thought was originally
there for employment of SLA-SLCMs by the Soviet Navy, as was
the material effort, and though relegated to a back-seat in
priority to SLBMs and anti-ship cruise-missiles. The
initial interest in SLA-SLCMs seems to have been revitalized
with the technological realization of better guidance
systems, longer ranges, and more compact design capabilities
along with geopolitical changes making their renewed
employment more cost-effective and of greater military
utility.
From the foregoing discussion, one could conclude the
impact of the thinking of Adm. Gorshkov to be the main
motivation in the primacy and revitalization of a utility
for the SLA-SLCM systems. However, the mission usefulness,
the applicability of weapons of SLCM character, the naval
mission orientation towards land strikes and anti-SLOC
objectives are echoed by other Soviet naval leaders,
including the successor to Gorshkov, Admiral of the Soviet
Fleet, V.N.Chernavin. For example, Vice-Admiral K. Stalbo,
in a recent article in the Soviet Naval digest, expounds
upon naval development and employment theory, emphasizing
the importance of 'balanced' naval operations, and strategic
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the importance of 'balanced' naval operations, and strategic
usefulness of fleets in war—especially "... submarine
nuclear-missile systems . . ."—without specifying ballistic
missiles, and supports the feeling of Adm. Gorshkov, in
highlighting the role of naval operations aside from
offensive at-sea actions saying "offensive operations at
sea against enemy combatants do not pursue goals of
capturing any geographic objectives" [Ref. 15:pp. 20-28].
He also notes the development of different naval operations
in the post-war years specifically mentioning "operations to
fight on ocean (sea) lines of communication." [Ref. 15 :p.
27]
This anti-SLOC orientation of Soviet naval objectives is
also recognized by other Soviet naval officers. Recognition
of the importance of maritime material movement in time of
war is key in many analyses, from those of Adm. Gorshkov, to
works of others specifically centering on Western merchant
marine importance in time of conflict [Ref. 16]. With refer-
ence to the Soviet naval ability to deliver attacks against
the military-economic potential of an enemy, Adm. Chernavin,
in assessing the element of combat readiness in a recent
article noted "Nuclear missile ordinance makes it possible,
in a matter of minutes , to deliver knock-out blows to all
the main elements of the armed forces groupings and all the
key military-economic and administrative-political centers
of an adversary nation" [Ref. 17]. Here, emphasis again
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falls upon the strike operation, with nuclear weapons
emphasis [specifically no mention of just SLBMs, or SSBNs]
,
and notably giving credit to forces capable of quickly
delivering ordinance on target—a capability characteristic
of coastal deployed SLA-SLCM carriers. Another key facet in
the Soviet CinC's statement on 'combat ready' strike
capability is the mention of targeting administrative-
political enemy centers
—
previously included in the
characteristics of operations against the shore, under
strike operations as defined by Gorshkov, this aspect was
most likely a mission of SLBM's then, but is potentially a
focus of targeting for SLA-SLCM 's in the future.
D. RHETORIC, REASONING AND ACTIONS: WHAT IT ALL MEANS
From these interpretations of Soviet leadership state-
ments—as to their intentions for employment of naval
forces, of the importance of differing missions, and of the
specific emphasis on strike actions and requisite force
capabilities (all of which appear relevant to the employment
of SLA-SLCM weapons) , and, taking into account the process
through which weapons acquisition and development occurs in
the Soviet political-military hierarchy, the evolution of
the Soviet SLA-SLCM programs can now be evaluated in a
differing light. From these indications and interpretations
many explanations and predictions may be attempted, the most
beneficial being, of course, the correct ones. However,
limited inputs, from wide-ranging sources of varying
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credibility, along with the impact of any Soviet efforts to
deny the West information, force analytical decisions and
judgment calls on what is at hand.
Here, several points about the Soviet SLA-SLCM programs
can be postulated from the aforementioned information.
First, it seems likely that given a Soviet weapons
acquisition process of the described three phases with two
decision steps—for project acceptance and commitment, and
for commitment to series production and operational use
—
that the present situation of the Soviet Navy's SS-NX-21
SLA-SLCM may be one where the program is presently just
beginning its third phase. In the case of this system,
surrounding external circumstances, like the Western INF
modernization deployments, and the arms-control push for
ballistic missile reductions, may have slowed the execution
of suitability review progress, not necessarily just
inherent program problems. If this is the case, when
employment and deployment decisions are concluded, the
program may move briskly and be visible more in indicators
such as weapons production factory construction, and drastic
increases in the level of submarines undergoing operational
certification exercises. Then again, the potential
strategic response mode of the program may be held at the
second decision stage, until such military capability as the
SS-NX-21 affords is needed in the strategic arsenal as an
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active or reserve component, or as a stop-gap measure until
encompassed by other advanced technical means.
If the Soviet initial motivation for SS-NX-21 was
political with respect to matching the Western cruisemissile
capability demonstrated in the TOMAHAWK program and deploy-
ment, the program may be in holding as evaluations determine
its strategic and economic necessity.
Notably, the Soviet SHADDOCK missile systems were
excluded from SALT I negotiations.^ From this previous
action, and the apparent resurgence in attention devoted to
land-attack capable cruise-missiles in the SS-NX-21 and
SS-NX-24 programs, a possible conclusion is the obvious
continuity of Soviet mind set that land-attack cruise-
missiles may serve a strategic purpose in the future. Their
writings reflect keen recognition of the capabilities of the
TOMAHAWK system— its undeterminable nuclear/conventional
character, its ability to increasingly surmount air-defenses
(and possibly some form of SDI) , its nature of being
launched apart from the homeland of the US, along with the
^Nowhere in the original SALT I Interim Agreement on
Strategic Arms is the issue of the capability of those
platforms capable of deploying a land-attack variant of the
SSN-3 SHADDOCK addressed. See the textual analysis of the
Committee on International Security and Arms Control,
National Academy of Sciences, Nuclear Amrs Control; Back-
ground and Issues , (Washington, D.C.: National Academy
Press, 1985) . Possibly the US assessment of the capability
as a threat had diminished by this 1972 accord, from earlier
fears (as late as 1967) of both SLBM and SLCM threats to the
continental US—see Joel Wit, "Soviet Cruise Missiles,"
IISS, Survival, Nov/Dec 1983, p. 250n6.
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evolutionary potential of cruise-missiles in general to go
faster, farther, carry a better payload and have improving
penetration and survivability with increasing accuracy—all
important capabilities in any weapons of the future. -^^
Meanwhile, a strident attempt to include some form of
cruise-missile control in arms-control also has been a
consistent Soviet theme [Ref. 18]. This may have been due
to Soviet difficulties in the development process in the
70 's while the US programs on SLCMs, GLCMs, and ALCMs neared
fruition. Development differences must also credit the
differing motivations behind the SS-NX-24 program—its
larger size, greater supersonic speed and different high-
altitude flight profile diverge from the Western and from
the SS-NX-21 program cruise-missile characteristics. Also
the requirement for a dedicated launch platform compared to
the greater inter-operability afforded in the torpedo-tube
compatibility of the SS-NX-21 bring into question the
possibility that Soviet strategic planning recognized new or
at least different requirements for a system of such
capabilities.
-'-^The Soviets have recognized and addressed TOMAHAWK,
and probably see the military usefulness in a system of
similar capability of their own. Adm. Chernavin comments on
its threatening nature against targets deep within the
Soviet Union in his address on the 27th CPSU Congress in
"The Navy—The 27th CPSU Congress," translated from Morskoy
Sbornik . No. 1, January, 1986, excerpted in Strategic Review .
Spring, 1986, p. 87.
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The state of US continental air defenses in the 1970 's,
severely lacking in their ability to detect, track and
counter either a small, or a large volume of cruise-missile
type targets, was openly evident to the Soviet military
intelligence analysts. This alone, or in addition to events
like the Pershing II and GLCM deployment decision of 1979,
may have prompted the venturing by the Soviets into the
SS-NX-24 program with its radically different capabilities
and therefore probably different intentions. The SS-NX-24,
now undergoing testing and evaluation [Ref. 4:p. 432] lags
the SS-NX-21 system by several years, and was therefore
probably conceived in the mid-to-late seventies. Quite
possibly, it is presently in the second phase of development
in the acquisition process, undergoing prototype refinement
and system element test and evaluation. Notably, in
contrast to the West, SSBNs in the Soviet inventory are not
relinquished to the scrap-yards as are many American
retiring ballistic-missile subs. At least two YANKEE class
SSBNs have been refitted for new missions in the early
1980 's, one to a possibly long-range capability and the
other to the launch platform for the SS-NX-24 SLCM.
Based on the open-source information on both these
systems, one could conclude that the SS-NX-21 ' Tomahawkski
'
[Ref. 6:pp. 75,79], is intended to function much as its
namesake—as an in-theater weapons system— for missions such
as the interdiction of Western SLOCs at their European
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terminals, or to target Western European continental
military installations deep inside national territories such
as rear-support points and nuclear weapons storage
facilities, or to disrupt NATO C-^I by targeting command and
control locations or communications and transportation
nodes. Also, this SLCM system has sister systems in the
Soviet AS-15 ALCM and SSC-X-4 GLCM much as the US has the
Boeing ALCM program and our European deployed GLCM strategic
systems [Ref. 4:p. 431; Ref. 7:pp. 35-38]. To believe that
the SS-NX-21 is solely a nuclear system may be shortsighted,
as the applicability of such a missile to carry a convent-
ional munitions payload is a real possibility much as the US
TOMAHAWK has a conventional variant. Chemical warfare has
the inherent military utility of greater anti-personnel
effectiveness per hit, compared to conventional munitions,
and the Soviet military, including the navy, is well versed
in offensive and defensive operations in chemical warfare. -'-^
This missile seems perfect to the tasks of reconnaissance or
even the grim capability of a CBW (chemical/biological
warfare) munitions carrier for missions into the North,
-^^A thorough look at Soviet military preparedness with
regard to chemical warfare is presented in the Department of
Defense's Soviet Military Power , 1987 edition. This
capability is acknowledged by other western analysts. See
W.F. and H.F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR , pp.
143-146, 244-246; Secretary of Defense Casper W. Weinburger,
Annual Report to the Congress; Fiscal Year 1988 (Washington,
D.C.: Department of Defense, 1987), p. 289.
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Central or Southern European TVDs the Soviet envision a
conflict with NATO will encompass.
Another aspect in considering the utility of these
SLA-SLCM systems is the potential usefulness of the
strategic employment of a sea-based cruise-missile—as a
possible replacement or augmenter to traditional strategic
forces. [Ref. 7:p. 37; Ref. 4:p. 432; Ref. 3:pp. 483,502]
With the real possibility of reductions of ballistic
missiles from arms-control negotiations, and the attendant
impact on SSBN and SLBM numbers, sea-based cruise-missiles
pose a possible replacement for both the Soviets and Western
strategic forces as the delivery means for nuclear warheads.
Thus, a possibility exists that the SS-NX-24, with its
predicted nuclear payload may be the eventual means of
Soviet strategic threat if ballistic-missile reductions
occur. Second, with the pursuit of strategic defense
measures by both superpowers, especially SDI, noted and
commented against by the Soviets, their progress with the
SS-NX-24 SLA-SLCM may be the anticipated solution to
maintaining a strategic threat against 'Imperialist'
America, by evolving a capability to target strategically
with endoatmospheric missiles vice exoatmospheric trajectory
ballistic missiles. Considering the impetus within the
Soviet military-political leadership to maintain a credible
deterrent posture by being able to overwhelmingly threaten
the military, political, and economic entities within the
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continental US, the more-capable and strategically
better-suited SS-NX-24 SLCM system may be the solution to
technical and tactical (strategic) requirements which have
emerged in the 1970 's. Also, the conversion of a YANKEE
class SSBN to carry the SS-NX-24 missiles is indicative of
the Soviet military hardware tendency never to scrap an
outdated or retired system, and rather than assigning these
older SSBN units to scrap, reserve or training functions,
their usefulness is extended as carrying platforms for the
new SLA-SLCM systems.
E. THE RESULTANT SOVIET SLCMS
Therefore, a rationale in the minds of Soviet military
leaders for pursuing the SLA-SLCM programs can been viewed
as clearer if considering the overall thought trends on
Naval mission priorities and interpreting the applicability
of systems with the characteristics of the SS-NX-21 and
SS-NX-24 to those Soviet strategic naval thinking on
priorities and requirements. The content of statements by
these leaders reflects the possibilities of dedicated strike
capability from forward deployed strategic assets such as
SLA-SLCM equipped units, both to threaten the continental US
taking advantage of the weakened state of CONUS air-defense/
anti-SLCM capability, and to enhance the multi-force/unified
operations tenet in a future conflict in the European
theater by the added capability of a multi-directional
(potentially) multi-mission cruise-missile threat.
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Observing the Soviet weapons acquisition process in
combination with intelligence collection against the
progress of these SLCM systems and noting the declaratory
and sublime statements by the Soviet naval leadership may
yield a better understanding of where the SS-NX-21 and
SS-NX-24 programs are today, and where they will be
tomorrow.
Challenges remain for the US and for the West in
general, to envision a future threat in the form of Soviet
reliance on strategic cruise-missiles, and the resultant
air-defense requirements this development will place on
air-defense modernization, on ASW measures to counter the
deployment platforms of the SLA-SLCMs like the newer AKULA
SSN [Ref. 7:p. 38], and to reflect on the CONUS defense
element of national defense within the context of planning
and procurement as is reflected in documents like the US
Navy's Maritime Strategy.
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III. SOVIET SLA-SLCM CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS
A. SLCM CAPABILITIES: WHAT WILL THE SOVIETS DO WITH THEM?
The manner, incentives and process by which the Soviet
military machine and its leadership, and the Soviet Navy
specifically, have refocused critical military-economic
potential and resources into their new sea-launched cruise-
missile programs is gravely important when considering these
systems strictly from an academically strategic or
analytical point-of-view. However, more critical and
important to the West, and especially the US Navy, is
considering exactly how the Soviets may utilize their modern
SLA-SLCM assets. This dilemma has underlying questions of
the military usefulness of these systems within the broad
sea-going mission requirements which Admiral Chernavin's
fleets must fulfill, and beyond that of expected Soviet
general theater and strategic roles into which the two stra-
tegic land-attack cruise-missiles can fit. While most
intelligence analysis focuses on the system characteristics
or component nature in question and furnishes estimates on
the resultant potential from observation and calculation,
the critical piece of information upon which planners and
decisionmakers rely is the conjecture of potential
application (s) of the weapon.
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To look at these two emerging SLA-SLCM systems, the
SS-NX-21 and the SS-NX-24, and merely acknowledge the
existence of such threatening capability is not enough for
those in military leadership positions. Analysts' reports
on the Soviet SLA-SLCM systems, and the tracking of their
operational maturation through observations will yield
opinions on the direction of their evolutionary progress,
but alone this is insufficient for planning the response of
tomorrow and the counteraction required today. Rather, at
our current point in monitoring and understanding these SLCM
capabilities, we must urgently deal with answering the
overall question of "what can the opponent do with the
weapon's capabilities once he gets it on-line?", instead of
just "what does the weapon do?".
The answer to this, of the employment possibilities of
the SLA-SLCM systems, is then combined with the Wests' best
estimates on the intentions of the Soviet military
leadership (utilizing hypothetical employment possibili-
ties)
,
and the result is a range of situations to which
planners and policymakers can react. More than just
sounding an alarm as to the fact that the "Bear" has a new
type of stick to wield, the Western naval leadership must
look at these emerging SLA-SLCM systems from the aspect of
what harm the "Bear" can inflict with them based on what we
know this 'stick' can do, on his past use of similar type
'sticks,' and react accordingly with changes in planning.
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procurement, strategy and tactics to negate the potential of
the SLA-SLCM 'stick.'
For this investigation, each of the two systems must be
examined first for its technical capabilities and character-
istics (as has been given in a broad sense in the preceding
chapter) , then for where those system particulars fit into
known or estimated Soviet Naval requirements for future
warfighting, generate potential implications by combining
capability with observed, decreed or predicted conduct
expected of our adversaries, and finally estimate what
impact the resultant possibilities may have on present US
plans, forces structure and on our future actions. The
implications will effect the present and future deterrence
strategy of the West, and specifically the current Maritime
Strategy of the US. Further, as the exact operational
extent of the Soviet SS-NX-21 SLA-SLCM remains either
unknown or unrevealed, a major consideration will be the
impact of the SS-NX-21 (and of the SS-NX-24 in the future)
on the current naval forces posture.
B. SOVIET NAVAL COMBAT PRINCIPLES IN PRACTICE
To begin this analysis of employment possibilities and
capabilities implications, requires a familiarization with
Soviet military strategy, military art, naval operational
art and naval warfighting tactics. This encompasses their
planned form of the conduct of hostilities on the high seas,
and from the sea to the shore, on a global scale and within
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a region, and how the use of naval forces is planned for
each. Also, considering the predicted nuclear warhead
aboard both the SS-NX-21 and SS-NX 24, the element of Soviet
strategy for employment of naval based nuclear weapons is
relevant. '-
Considering these characteristics of the application of
Soviet naval forces to achieve strategic goals, the nature
of their use is guided by much the same fundamentals as will
be Soviet land warfare. From past investigations and much
analysis on this, strategic Soviet naval results will
essentially serve to further overall strategic Soviet land
orientated goals. Their style, as seen in numerous
analyses, includes frequently noted considerations of
desired surprise, seizing and maintaining the initiative
during the conduct of war, application of forces in mass and
at desired places and times, and actions based on favorable
correlation of forces. ^ As the aforementioned discussion of
•^The direction in this investigation is that of
promoting further Western thought about the military impact
of these Soviet SLA-SLCM weapons. The 'strategic' reference
given to Soviet employment suggestions and throughout this
examination should be taken to mean application in a Western
sense, i.e., as a weapon for waging combat on targets in the
opponents territory. References to strategic utilization by
the Soviets are promoted in the sense of those decision-
makers who will plan, procure and conduct actual hostilities
against the US or other Western allies in a conflict.
^The elements of surprise, initiative, application of
forces in mass, timeliness and choice of targets, and the
factor of correlation of forces, are prevelant in Soviet
military writings, from tactical thinking to strategic
planning. Analysis of these aspects in the West is numerous
and varied in scope. Theoretitians such as Sun Tsu and
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the guidelines of naval thought which Admiral Gorshkov
promulgated while the leader of the Soviet navy, and which
remain essentially steadfast since the transition of
leadership to Admiral Chernavin, these elements of war or
principles of Soviet military thought will guide Soviet
conduct in hostilities should they occur today or in the
near future. Admiral Chernavin now seems intent on guiding
his navy to more effective combined arms abilities,
integration of modern technology, and in reinforcement of
the subservient role the Soviet navy and its operations play
to those of combined Soviet forces. [Ref. 19]
Particular to the aspect of the application of naval
forces, and with regard to SLA-SLCMs, is the factor of force
as applied to strategic shore objectives from naval units:
the fact is that a SLA-SLCM threat to either CONUS (contin-
ental United States territory) or allied territory may be
waged from weapons platforms remote to the Soviet Union
[Ref. 8:pp. 2,21-28]. This detached context is notable in
the sense that the threat indicators normally expected in
the conduct of strategic hostilities are substantially
absent or at least diminished.-^ This factor could aid in
Clausewitz are noted in these analyses as mainstays in
Soviet military thoughts. These strategists are also
prevelant in Western military thinking and strategy in our
own 'Principles of War.'
^The concept of a remote strategic offensive capability
is not new in the sense of the superpowers having maintained
remote bomber bases in the past, and the present US TOMAHAWK
capability also is akin to this. However, one analysis
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the attainment of the Soviet warfighting style element of
surprise. Further, the absence of major strategic warning
tipoffs also promotes the attainment of the initiative,
whether the SLA-SLCMs are employed against the West at the
inception of hostilities, or after the battle has been
joined.
The potential of numerous basing platforms for the
SS-NX-21 due to its predicted universal torpedo-tube launch
capability create an interoperable, autonomous threat
potential. This capability differs from the past trends in
Soviet military hardware design of more easily discernible
strategic weapons features on naval platforms, and provides
for the capability of strategic attack in platforms which
ostensibly may be engaged in other missions. For example,
Soviet SSNs and SSGNs engaged in pro-SSBN missions in the
regions of the Soviet bastions, may also have the potential
to effect attacks upon the shores of Japan from the Sea of
Okhotsk, attacks upon ports in England from secure havens in
the Baltic or North Atlantic, or attacks upon Norfolk or
Mayport from positions off our coasts while engaged in
pro-SSBN (YANKEE stations) or anti-SSBN (anti-TRIDENT)
patrols. While Soviet command and control intentions for
the employment of strategic SLCM weapons, either nuclear, or
cited here holds that the attainment of a strategic
capability in the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM
missiles in Western Europe is being countered by the advent
of the Soviet sea-based strategic land-attack capability of
their SLCMs.
66
of the conventional variety (a possibility in the future
evolution of Soviet SLA-SLCMs which should not be ruled
out) , remain unclear at this time, past C-^ evidence can be
applied from the trends of forward deployment of Soviet
SSBNs off the East and West coasts of the US. For nuclear
SLA-SLCMs, the probability of similar C-^ characteristics to
those of Soviet SLBM platforms seems a reasonable
assumption.
This though must presented with the caveat of possible
employment of these SLA-SLCMs in premeditated and
pre-planned strikes, also a characteristic of Soviet
warfighting style. Thus, rigid command and control measures
normally associated with strategic weapons management can be
absent if the SLA-SLCMs are employed in preemptive
hostilities. The analysis of employment of submarines by
the Soviets is a whole topic in itself, but one opinion is
that the potential exists for less rigid control over
out-of-area submarine forces than expected of the
centralized Soviet military machine."^ This claim seems
plausible for coordinated, pre-planned evolutions such as
are possible with premeditated attacks from SLCM firing
^An extensive analysis is provided on the aspect of
Soviet submarines by Milan Vego in his article in the Naval
War College Review , wherein he notes one Soviet naval author
in the October 1982 issue of Morskov Sbornik (the Navy
Journal) who states Soviet submarines will be efectively
employed [by] "optimal combination of centralized and
decentralized control." See Milan Vego, "The Role of the
Attack Submarines in Soviet Naval Theory" in the Naval War
College Review . Vol. 36, No. 6, p. 62, 64n45.
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submarines. Firing tactics can effect mass attack as the
Soviets historically decreed is desired, b/ the employment
of merely a few subs, firing salvos of several missiles
each, in coordinated and sequenced attacks on a single or
several specified Western targets. Pre-planned targeting
schemes for deployed SLA-SLCM carrying platforms could
provide a possible answer to complex control logistics, and
make readily available strategic firepower to the Soviet
commander controlling military operations crossing oceanic
boundaries, who desires single point target attacks effected
in a battle.
Another element is the often described and professed
Soviet desire to secure a qi-ick and decisive victory, mainly
through the efforts of the combination of many forms of arms
in their "combined arms" feature of Soviet warfighting
style. Here, the newly available SLA-SLCMs provide the
ability to attain this end in a conflict at sea, by
achieving strategic surprise and tactical initiative in
conducting a campaign against Western SLOCs at their
end-points. Reasonable conjecture in Western strategic
analysis may hold that times of heightened tensions will
find US and friendly naval forces pre-dispersed, and similar
actions should be expected on the part of the Soviets.
However, mobilization of the industrial capacity to
support a conflict in Europe, or in the Pacific, will lag
such events preceding the commencement of hostilities.
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Anticipating protracted logistical support for the European
theater may find US ports busy in preparatory loading and
storage of war materials, as convoys come together prior to
oceanic transits, and therefore seem lucrative targets to
Soviet ocean theater commanders for applying multiple
direction and multiple types of weapons in coordinated
attacks.^
In line with the previous mentioned elements of Soviet
military style in the conduct of hostilities, is this factor
or tenet which colors their strategic planning—the desire
to employ forces in combined efforts of at least several
different types of arms against an opponent or target. An
example of this is the Soviet naval anti-carrier strategy
wherein air, surface and subsurface elements of their forces
would engage an enemy (US) carrier best when utilized in a
combined, synergistic attack. The aim in this strategy is
to overwhelm the Western echeloned defenses, thus providing
penetration to the US aircraft carrier target, which has
long been a principle at-sea Soviet naval objective. Now,
^The Soviets two oceanic TVD's, the Atlantic and
Arctic, will probably contain the majority of sea-going
combat action if a confrontation occurs between the super-
powers over Western Europe. As outlined in the US
Department of Defense yearly handbook on the Soviet
military, Soviet Military Power. 1987 . the Soviets probably
attach the same importance to operations in these areas, in
the Arctic due to their Bastions pro-SSBN strategy, and in
the Atlantic due to their sea-going objective of disruption
of the SLOC's between the US and Western Europe. Contingen-
cy nuclear strike operations for the Soviets seem possible,
and SLA-SLCMs provide possibly a present and a future means
for such operations.
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with the advent of a SLA-SLCM capability in their present or
soon-to-be-deployed SS-NX-21, with its range of approximate-
ly 3000 km, and the sister and brother cruise-missile
programs of the air-launched AS-15 and ground-launched
SSC-X-4 on-line or imminently operational, combined and
coordinated cruise-missile attacks are fast becoming a
possibility for the Soviets in the Western European TVD's.
[Ref. 7:pp. 37-38]
The potential also exists for the future employment of
the same form of threat against the continental US, as
Bear-H ALCM carrier aircraft have been known to regularly
circuit the outer regions of the US defense perimeter on
training flights. Other types of Soviet cruise-missiles, if
utilized in concert with SLA-SLCMs launched from a handful
of Soviet submarines against the US or territories of our
allies, may create a situation where our air-defense
capabilities may be sorely taxed if tested while the
majority of our forces are engaged in a European continental
conflict. This issue of the Continental air-defense of the
United States will be addressed shortly.
C. SLA-SLCMS AND SOVIET OCEANIC OBJECTIVES
Soviet naval out-of-area force level estimates in time
of war range from a few submarines dedicated to anti-SSBN
missions outside US SSBN ports, to many in efforts to
conduct anti-SLOC missions against the probable US logist-
ical support of war in Europe. The capability of a small
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force of SLA-SLCM capable submarines to interdict the
resupply efforts between the US mainland and Europe, either
in the opening phases or in the midst of a general conflict,
or to swing the correlation of forces in the East's
direction by severing the supply lifeline to Western forces
in the European theater is not hard to imagine. Realistic-
ally, while attacks upon the territory of the superpowers is
viewed as a major escalatory step in the strategic thinking
of the West, this same predilection may not hold true for
Soviet naval planners, and the Soviets may chose to initiate
hostilities or shift the conduct of the war in their favor
by negating the maritime capability of the US in attacks
upon its port facilities and shipping industry.
Further, to return to the aspect of SLOC interdiction,
if Western Europe is indeed the location of the superpower
confrontation, Soviet Sea-Control (or realistically 'sea-
denial' since waters adjacent to NATO nations will be
closely guarded and swept for intruders) , may have to focus
on the arrival points for war materials and manpower from
the US and supporting friendly nations. Soviet strategic
naval planners will not have to debate the possible
confrontation with US/NATO naval forces in unfriendly waters
to attain this objective—SLA-SLCMs could provide their
naval tacticians with the disruptive and interdiction
ability against English and French ports. West German and
Scandinavian maritime repair facilities, or even horizontal
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escalatory actions against Japan, China, or our Pacific
Ocean military bases far-removed from the main
conflagration. With ports capable of off-loading vessels a
main target, renewed importance is focused again on other
warfighting logistical aspects such as sea-lift vessels with
self-unloading capability able to operate in less developed
port facilities, on air-cushion type craft able to disembark
wheeled cargo without the necessary dock facilities needed
by RO/RO transport vessels, and even more-so on the whole
field of logistical support from the US, the great CONVOY
debate.
^
D. SLA-SLCMS AND SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT
Should the conflict occurring in Europe escalate to
limited employment of nuclear weapons, either beginning
through the use of the tactical battle-field type or else-
wise, and regardless of the aspect of the initiation of
^The issue of our ability to reinforce a conflict in
the European theater has existed since the opening days of
the 'Cold-War.' Under this, are topics such aa strategic
mobility and lift capability, force size in vessels capable
of material and manpower transport, and also capable of
offloading in undeveloped or damaged harbors and beaches.
For further discussion on the state of the American Sea-Lift
situation see Vice Admiral W.H. Rowden, USN, "Strategic
Sealift and the Merchant Marine," Defense magazine, July,
1985, (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1985), pp. 14-18; Strategic
Mobility: Can We Get There From Here— in Time? . 1984,
Special Report, (Arlington, Va. : Association of the United
States Army, 1984) ; Admiral James L. Holloway III, USN
(Ret. ), "Sealift, " in US Naval Institutes Proceedings . June
1983, (Annapolis: US Naval Institute, 1983), pp. 28-38;
"Strategic Sealift gives MSC more Clout," in Marine
Engineering Log . September, 1985, (New York:
Simmons-Boardman Publishing Corp., 1985), pp. 67-73.
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their use, either first ashore or at-sea first, the Soviets
will be able to engage at sea with nuclear weapons, tactic-
ally strategically. The emerging SLA-SLCMs upon which this
investigation centers are estimated to be nuclear, and could
therefore provide the Soviet attack submarine fleet units
with a reserve, reactionary, or dedicated nuclear strike
capability, (much as the TOMAHAWK TLAM/N provides for US
Navy forces afloat today) if the battle were to shift to
that footing. This capability should not be underestimated,
as each aspect of an enemy's capability to wage a particular
form of combat all combine to broaden their overall
strategic strength, a factor in which the Soviet Union
already exceeds the US, and also their endurance in nuclear
hostilities, an escalation level US naval strategy seeks to
refrain from.
As mentioned earlier, the possibility of the super-
powers ' territories being a sanctuary from the ravages of a
conflict being conducted in Europe or elsewhere, may be
solely a US assumption. Such was the case for example, with
the aspect of US nuclear strategy followed in the late
sixties of Assured Destruction (AD) being a 'mutual' aspect
of the superpower nuclear contest—which continued and
progressive Soviet strategic systems growth and improvement
over the past twenty-five years has surely proved wrong. If
the Soviets initiate hostilities, in whatever form, possibly
clouded in the fog of deception and decoying events
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elsewhere in the world, preemptive strikes may be one form
of waging the war from their standpoint. As such a
possibility exists, the Soviet naval leadership surely is
fully aware of the strategic import and associated
vulnerability of their own bases, such as Murmansk,
Petropavlovsk, Leningrad, and Vladivostok. With this
factor, and mindful of the US declared potential to strike
such bases in the conduct of a superpower conflict
[Ref. 20:pp. 10-13], the Soviet naval planners may elect to
preemptively strike US naval facilities along our coasts,
and/or those of our allies in Europe and in the Pacific.
The destruction, even partial, of our main naval bases (such
as Bangor, San Diego, Mayport, Charleston or Norfolk) would
immediately force self-sufficiency upon our dispersed forces
afloat, constrain our repair capability for vessels
suffering battle wounds, and could negate stockpiles of
materials, spare-parts, and ammunition which will be sorely
needed in the opening period of a general conflict.
The preemptive strike may be a limited nuclear attack in
concert with initial nuclear employment in the battle-zones
ashore, or an action apart from the land conflict. Promoted
as a limited attack, and with the conviction of refraining
from a general strategic exchange, the Soviets may achieve
surprise, seize the initiative, and effect a decapitation
only of vital US naval organs. This itself would severely
impact on the conduct of defensive operations by the NATO
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forces in Europe, and place hard demands upon our own
forward deployed naval forces and those of our allies.
SLA-SLCMs, of the nuclear variety as we believe the current
Soviet SS-NX-21 is (and also its future big-brother, the
SS-NX-24) in concert with ALCMs could provide the means for
this form of Soviet strike. [Ref. 7: p. 38]
Should the Soviet strategists chose to attempt a broad
strategic decapitation form of attack upon the US, SLA-SLCMs
also are a capable means to achieve their strategic ends.
Utilized in combination with possible 'Fifth Column'
sabotage actions, a nuclear strike employing the SS-NX-21
may be able to achieve surprise in targeting our National
Command Authority, the Pentagon, vital command links in our
C-^ network, and possibly our Strategic Air Command air
facilities along the US coast. Air-defense capabilities of
the US, today and tomorrow, will impact on the effective
penetration ability of low-flying and fast enemy cruise-
missiles, and our ability to defend our own coastlines from
low-flying, air-breathing threats becomes a relevant
consideration in our National Security Strategy.
The US Navy ' s part in the future and current coastal
defense problem is again the subject of detailed analysis in
our strategic naval planning, and is tied to real naval
missions such as AAW, and ASW. The current Air-Defense
Initiative (ADI) addresses such considerations and the
stance the Navy takes on this initiative will surely impact
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on the future defense of the nation, on US Navy strategy,
plans, procurement and force structure. While defense of
Strategic Air Command facilities seems the parochial task of
another service, the survival of US naval bases is surely a
Navy matter, and reflection on the impact of a relatively
surprising attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, will
support this opinion. Were the same type and magnitude of
event to occur today at just one base, Norfolk, a major
impact of lasting duration would be felt by the US Atlantic
fleets. This alone would be even more important if
preparations were underway for a conflict in the NATO
region, and the converse is true for a base such as San
Diego, if Korea were the hot-spot to which the US Navy must
respond.
The SS-NX-24, from what the West has observed about it,
and released for publication, seems a more capable strategic
asset of the cruise-missile variety. Larger, faster and
possibly high-flying, this SLA-SLCM may be the true
strategic form of cruise-missile for the Soviets. While the
missile and its possibly dedicated submarine launch platform
are evidently still in the second phase of their
developmental process, this system holds several potential
applications. The SS-NX-24 nuclear variant, would be the
perfect solution to the possible future limitation and
reduction of submarine-launched ballistic-missiles in
arms-control agreements. Or, the system may be part of a
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Soviet effort towards an intermediate solution to American
and Western Strategic Defense Initiative technology's threat
to the mission capability of the Soviet Strategic Rocket
Forces (SRF) . The SS-NX-24, with its greater speed in
comparison to its brother SLCM, may be intended to aid in
the role of surprise attack on US strategic facilities,
where time is critical in targeting near-coast command and
control sites, satellite communications facilities, and SAC
bomber bases (prior to the launch of ready-alert aircraft)
.
Also, as noted earlier, the development of the SS-NX-24
system will provide a purpose for aging ballistic-missile
submarines. The differences notable in the SS-NX-24 SLCM
clearly deserve intense monitoring as this may become the
future threat to the US when our SDI defenses make ICBM
threats less viable.
The issue of the form of strategic attack which the
Soviet Union is likely to attempt and all of the encompassed
factors such as where, which targets, what scope of nuclear
weapons use, or what situations will precede the attack, is
in itself a major strategy debate and not appropriate to
speculation here on the employment of SLA-SLCMs.^ Suffice
"^For further discussion on Soviet nuclear strategy see
Steven J. Cimbala, "Soviet Nuclear Strategies: Will They do
the Expected?", in Strategic Review . Fall 1985, (Wash-
ington, D.C.: United States Strategic Institute, 1985), pp.
67-77; G.H. McCormick and M.E. Miller, "American Seapower at
Risk: Nuclear Weapons in Soviet Naval Planning," in Orbis .
Summer 1981, Vol. 25, No. 2, (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy
Research Institute, 1981), pp. 351-367.
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to say though, that the SS-NX-21, and the SS-NX-24 will
provide the Soviet Navy with broader capability to serve the
desires of Soviet military leadership and strategists should
they elect to employ nuclear weapons and cross the
'fire-break' in vertical escalation from conventional to
nuclear means which presently the US Maritime Strategy seeks
to prevent. [Ref. 20:p. 13]
E. IMPLICATIONS FOR WESTERN DETERRENCE AND FORCES
The Soviets may soon poses the means to conduct a
different form of strategic and tactical attack in their new
SLA-SLCMs. The SS-NX-21, and its bigger brother the
SS-NX-24, may be the lead system in a shift to air-breathing
threats, as the Wests', and especially the United States
air-defense capabilities are sorely in need of
reinforcement. This weakness has probably not gone without
notice by the Soviets, much as they noted with pleasure our
earlier decisions to halt the development of, and then
dismantle our own ABM systems. The SS-NX-21 seems the
perfect means by which the Soviet Navy can conduct stand-off
attacks against Western European or Pacific targets, and a
future capability for conventional ordnance delivery may
further enhance the utility of this system in the
conventional phase of hostilities.^ This system seems
^The aspect of understanding the Soviet thinking on the
conduct of the war has been a major Western effort since the
early 1950 's. Western opinion on this has noted shifts from
believing the Soviets planned on conducting a solely nuclear
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perfect for employment against Western European theater
maritime facilities and for broadening the mission
capabilities of modern SSN and SSGN submarines. The
SS-NX-21 maybe the system the West should watch most
closely, for the Soviets unlike the US Navy, have not
prominently displayed this system.
The SS-NX-24, newer and more vague to the West, may be
the Soviet means to replace ballistic missiles, utilize
retiring ballistic-missile submarines, take advantage of
currently weak US and NATO air-defense capabilities, or
circumvent the emerging US SDI defense measures. The
SS-NX-24 will pose a differing air-defense problem for the
US due to its faster characteristics, and in conjunction
with the SS-NX-21 certainly tax existing detection, tracking
and intercept means currently available in CONUS. Much like
the current situation of dif ficult-to-manage US commercial
air traffic, our air-defense CONUS detection and response
capabilities are in need of refurbishment. Current efforts
effort, to a combined nuclear and conventional campaign, to
opinions of the Easts planning for an extended phase of
conventional hostilities. In each, Western opinion noted
specific roles and missions accorded to the Soviet Navy,
some which have been cited throughout this investigation.
Other studies dealing with these naval roles, missions and
Soviet outlook on the conduct of a superpower conflict are
James J. Tritten, Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare
^
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1986); Desmond Ball, "Nuclear War
at Sea," in International Security , Vol. 10, No. 3, (Cam-
bridge: MIT Press, 1985), pp. 3-31; Gordon H. McCormick and
Mark E. Miller, "American Seapower at Risk: Nuclear Weapons
in Soviet Naval Planning," in ORBIS, Summer 1981, pp. 351
-367.
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under the Reagan administration as part of strategic modern-
ization will counteract deficiencies against known strategic
threats, but these new SLA-SLCMs threats need special
attention.
How the US Navy and the American defense establishment
view these Soviet SLA-SLCM systems, within our existing
naval strategy, and its future derivations, is the issue at
hand following upon the illumination of the Soviets employ-
ment possibilities. To answer this question, our Maritime
Strategy must be considered for how it may accommodate this
threat in its present context, with our emphasis on forward
operations. Which elements of our national defense system
can counter a possibly operational Soviet SS-NX-21 threat,
what new solutions are feasible, suitable and practical to
respond to the SS-NX-21 and SS-NX-24, and what operational
changes are required to accomplish this task are the main
dilemmas.
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IV. RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET SLA-SLCM
A. THE MARITIME STRATEGY AND A US NAVAL POSTURE
At present, the United States Navy plans, procures and
operates under the auspice of the Maritime Strategy-'-, an
element of our national military strategy and the maritime
foundation of our alliance ties in the Atlantic and Pacific.
Under this grand plan, the US Navy is the prime element in
the published doctrine for conduct of military operations on
and over the seas to provide for the defense of this nation,
the maintenance of alliances, the influence of neutral and
third-world nations, and the conduct of maritime related
hostilities should the national security strategy of deterr-
ence fail. In the first of these objectives, all of the
armed forces of the nation are responsible for the defense
of its territory, peoples and principles. In the last
objective presented here, the US Navy has as its charter the
preparedness and maintenance of naval forces of all forms to
execute national political and foreign policy decisions.
-^The maritime strategy considered here is not the
general topic dealt with in many ways, by the likes of Mahan
Corbett and Roosevelt, since the early days of the Union and
Colonial Navy. Rather, Admiral James D. Watkins, then Chief
of Naval Operations, set forth a clear document of the
direction, tone, caliber and objectives for the US Navy of
the 1980 's and beyond in his statement "The Maritime Stra-
tegy," supplement to the US Naval Institute's Proceedings .
January, 1986, (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 1986)
.
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Security postures for the US have varied over the past
two hundred plus odd years, from survival to isolationist to
aggressive stances, to the present deterrence posture in our
global competition with communist polarized nations led by
the Soviet Union. The goals of our national military
strategy and of the Maritime Strategy, its naval component,
are foremost the deterrence of hostilities while maintaining
freedom from coercion and threats for ourselves and our
allies, and pursuing worldly ambitions of self-determinism
and self-actualization for ourselves and other nations,
states and peoples. Following on this is the accepted real
possibility that the deterrence posture may sometime,
somehow fail, necessitating actions on the part of the
forces of the US and her allies to return to peaceful
stability. The Maritime Strategy here too provides
guidelines for the conduct of hostilities against the
principle probable adversary, the Soviets. The main
emphasis upon which the Strategy channels future
applications of naval forces is the characteristic Forward
posture, which must be examined closely for its relationship
to meeting the requirement for actual defense of the
continental US and territories of our allies.
^
^The national security objectives established under
President Reagan are clear in presenting goals to achieve
national interests. In National Security Strategy of the
United States
.
(Washington, D. C. : The White House, 1987), p.
4, the executive branch states the "principle objectives"
and lists national security first. Under this objective are
prioritized specific elements of this objective, starting
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The underlying dilemma posed by the existence of Soviet
SLA-SLCMs and their possible future deployment is how the
Maritime Strategy in its present form can meet this
potential new threat, in a strategy where the majority of
our naval forces are forward dispersed or engaged in time of
conflict.-^ With the umbrella charter of the US Navy to
provide for the defense of the nation acting as a component
of the national military strategy, and with the real
potential that the Soviet SS-NX-21 SLCMs are nearing
with deterring hostile attack on the US, and defeating such
an attack if it should occur. The Secretary of Defense
Report of the Secretary of Defense, Casper W. Weinberger, to
the Congress, Fiscal Year 1988 , (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 15, expresses this
responsibility in another form in his annual congressional
report, saying in explanation of defense planning "The need
for military forces arises from US security interests and
commitments. These interests are threatened by adversaries
in ways that could create contingencies that US forces must
then be able to meet." This rationale can be directly
applied to the necessity for a policy reaction to the
strategic threat in SLA-SLCMs.
•^Admiral Watkins clearly sets forth his views on the
employment of our naval forces in meeting the Soviets on the
high-seas. The main elements are (1) achieving deterrence
by wining in a crisis, controling escalation, ceding nothing
to agressors by default, denying the adversary the option of
engaging on their own terms, all via forward movement and
speedy and decisive employment decisions; (2) in acting once
hostilities have occurred, seizing the initiative,
controling the flow of the battle, and employment of air,
surface, subsurface, and amphibious forces to counter the
enemy; (3) in carrying the battle to the Soviet naval
forces, with the main objective being their destruction,
threaten their bases and logistics, and lessen the
likelyhood of nuclear escalation by altering the nuclear
equation in favor of the West, all in global, synchronized,
coalition efforts. See Adm. James D. Watkins, "The Maritime




operational readiness, while the follow-on SS-NX-24 system
continues in test and evaluation, serious strategic
consideration must be given to responding to these strategic
land-attack threats.
The Maritime Strategy correctly projects that the most
favorable manner in which to conduct at-sea naval actions
against the ever-expansive blue-water Soviet fleets is to
meet them in their own local, to complicate their aggressive
intentions by threatening their strategic reserve,
neutralizing their naval presence before it may interdict on
the Western Sea Lines of Communication in either the
Atlantic or Pacific, keeping their forces occupied in all
ocean theaters and also ashore, therefore incapable of
completing their objectives of sea-denial or sea-control,
and carrying the conflict into their own territory if
required.
The Maritime Strategy also assumes Soviet out-of-area
forces will have to be countered, and that attempts to
disrupt the Western support of efforts in a European or
Asian conflict will necessitate readiness for defense of the
coastal regions of the US. The planning, allocation of
resources, and readiness of this defensive approach in the
current Maritime Strategy must also be reviewed in light of
the emerging Soviet SLA-SLCM threats.
If a protracted conflict results from Western desires to
complicate Soviet goals of a swift and massive surprising
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assault on the West, be it for limited or continental
strategic objectives, the ability of Western forces to
maintain logistical continuity to the theater of action will
be paramount. Accordingly, Soviet efforts to disrupt this
Western action may be more severe and potentially executed
earlier than anticipated or deducted in our analysis of
Soviet strategic intentions and their prioritization of
naval missions in meeting strategic objectives. SLA-SLCMs
provide Soviet strategists in the VGK a means to execute
these missions near our own and friendly shores, especially
from submarines dispersed earlier on during rising
tensions.
^
Thus the debate posed here is really based on the
unknown—how a future conflict between the West and East
will be initiated and proceed. Because this seems obviously
a fairly unpredictable element in Western strategic
planning, and because turning reactionary responses in
"^When considering the employment of SLA-SLCMs by the
Soviets, the use can be viewed in two catagories familiar in
the West. The 'strategic' sense, concerning nuclear attacks
on the territory of the opponent superpower, or the 'tac-
tical' sense, comprised of any unmber of possibilities of
conventional attacks in battle zones. If Europe is the
region of conflict, Soviet employment of a conventional
varient of the SLA-SLCM against battle zone military targets
may be a tactical action, executed by a theater of strategic
military action (TVD) commander, whereas a nuclear attack on
a US port utilizing SLA-SLCMs would be a strategic decision
and executed at a higher military leadership level in the
USSR, in the supreme high command or ' Stavka ' (VGK). See
J.G. Hines and P. A. Petersen, "Changing the Soviet System of
Control," in International Defense Review . Vol. 19, No. 3,
pp. 281-289, (Geneva, Switzerland: Interavia, S.A., 1986).
85
conflict into forward initiative gaining actions is not
always a universal possibility, a contention which may be
posed is that the factor of Soviet capability to employ
SLA-SLCMs, either in the predicted nuclear or possible
conventional variants, necessitates a corresponding
preparedness in our own planning and forces structure.
Therefore Soviet SLCM strategic land-attack capabilities
must be addressed in our Maritime Strategy and its future
derivatives.
The issues, of defense as an element in our maritime
planning, of the weight it must be assigned in comparison to
the premise of a forward posture, of our present planning to
counter Soviet efforts to interdict Western SLOCs and of our
readiness to provide for the defense of our coastal regions,
ports, harbors and maritime facilities, and of the potential
impact of Soviet employment of SLA-SLCMs in a multitude of
possible manners on the various elements which comprise our
Maritime Strategy must each be examined in detail. Further,
how the US Navy, in its present form, acting under the
Maritime Strategy, would react to aggressive actions which
may be effected with SLA-SLCMs must also be thought through.
Finally, possible alternative measures, plans and possible
ways of meeting to the Soviet SLA-SLCM threat can be
postulated, analyzed within the context of the guidelines
established by the Maritime Strategy, and future modificat-
ions to these responses can be suggested.
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B. DEFENSE AS A CONSTITUENT OF WESTERN NAVAL PLANNING
Defense in one sense portrays a reserved stance toward
aggression, a posture which fitted this nation earlier on in
isolationist periods when the insular oceans separated the
continental US from most willing but unable enemies.
Defense may also be interpreted to mean to proper planning
and anticipation of possible threats. Defense, with respect
to US national security policy and specifically maritime
policy, has been viewed recently as more of the former than
the later. Former Navy Secretary Lehman described the US
geostrategic mindset noting that ". . . as a nation, we have
traditionally struck a defensive posture . . . [evolving]
from geostrategic imperatives [and] societal and cultural
values ..." [Ref. 21]. As most of the nations of the
Western world, especially the US, do not profess to
initiating actions of aggressive or coercive nature, a
defensive nature is a natural security position. With this
defensive posture element goes the presumption that strong
readiness to meet aggressive actions is the best measure to
achieve deterrence of threats and coercion, and maintain
peace and global equilibrium. Yet, the US as a leader of
the free world is also responsible for promoting and
supporting allies and aiding pro-Western actions across the
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seas.^ For this, the US has maintained a strong naval
capability since the turn of the century.
However today, military capabilities such as strategic
nuclear forces bridge the boundaries of the oceans through
technological innovations— in missile technology, guidance
capabilities and improved accuracy, and the mammoth
destructive power of nuclear weapons. Also, technological
advances have shortened geographical distances between the
superpowers through high-speed communications of many forms,
satellite information collection and relay capabilities
increasing vulnerability to intelligence gathering and
partially negating concealment measures, and telecommunicat-
ions which have revolutionized the media creating in it a
geopolitical tool useful in almost all phases of the bipolar
competition.
To counter the impact of technology in closing the
battle between the superpowers, numerous weapons forms have
played across the military balance between the US and USSR.
Notable are the intercontinental missile, long-range bomber
and the aircraft carrier, in altering the military distance
^The actual responsibilities which the US assigns
itself are clearly delineated in the President Reagan's
National Security Strategy of the United States . (Wash-
ington, D.C.: The White House, 1987), pp. 4-7, and the
deterrence and defense from attack are specifically
delineated at the head of priorities under the security of
the nation and our allies, along with defeating attacks if
they occur. Further down this list are other specifically
maritime related objectives of assuring unimpeded US access
to the oceans, and preventing domination of the Eurasian
landmass by the Soviets, both related to maintenance of SLOCs
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between the competitors. The solution posed in the Maritime
Strategy to the ability of an adversary to inflict damage
upon the territory of the US or its allies, is that of
fighting forward when deterrence fails. The premise behind
this train of thought, is that a forward coalition maritime
action will negate the military potential of an enemy's
naval forces before he may successfully employ it against
the US mainland or that of the NATO or Pacific allies.
Along with this are the aspects of denying the adversary any
territorial gains, destroying his maritime forces,
protecting vital support and communications between the
states and the probable European theater of conflict,
supporting the land battle in that theater, and securing the
termination of the conflict on 'favorable terms.'
[Ref. 20:p. 17]
These characteristics raise the questions of: time, as
both a constraint against the capability to achieve the
broad range of maritime responsibilities inherent in the
denial, destruction, protection and support missions which
the US Navy must fulfill, and as a critical constituent in
the escalatory calculations of an adversary; distance, as a
hinderance to maneuver of the required forces to achieve the
maritime requirements of th.-" s strategy, as an obstacle for
protective missions, and a geographic reality in supportive
logistics. Also, the vastness and opaqueness of the seas to
ASW efforts, is even more enhanced in reasonable assumption
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that forces will be dispersed in the escalating tensions
before the outbreak of a conflict.
The Soviet SLA-SLCMs represent a capability to overcome
the obstacles of time, by weapons systems capable of
inflicting damage on Western coastal targets with little or
no associated warning time characteristic of air and
ballistic missile threats. In this aspect, time is somewhat
suppressed as a military constraint and the potential for
Soviet strategic surprise is heightened.
Distance, the other constraint to maritime operations,
is negated in the West's Maritime Strategy by the planned
forward stance, in the preparations for and the conduct of
hostilities. The hindrance of distance is also negated in
the emerging Soviet SLA-SLCM capability, as cruise-missile
launchers off US or allied coasts can dramatically shorten
weapon-to-target time. Employing systems not geostrateg-
ically based in the USSR, SLA-SLCMs will mirror the
strategic relationship of the US TOMAHAWK to the Soviet and
Eastern Block territory. Scientifically, speed is the
logical follow-on issue or impediment in an opponents
ability to inflict strategic damage. Speed has been
overcome in other strategic weapons systems such as with the
capability of ballistic missiles. Notably, the SS-NX-24
SLA-SLCM system the Soviets are evolving is estimated as far
faster than its SLCM predecessor. These three physical
factors can also be viewed as constraints when considered in
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a 'defensive' sense, as are considered in meeting most
tactical and strategic threats today (i.e., the response the
US Navy plans for a certain Soviet ASM is based on its
performance in specifically these, and several other key
parameters) . Therefore, time, distance and speed must be
guides for analyzing the appropriate response to the
SLA-SLCM threat, a defensive reaction which must occur
starting from within the Maritime Strategy.
Defensive constituents of a broader Maritime Strategy
will address which actions an adversary can achieve before,
and during hostilities, that may impact on the war-fighting
events such as the preparations, logistics, material and
manpower movement, and repair/resupply of naval vessels
which will be ongoing behind the forward deployed and
engaged Western naval forces. In line with this, the entire
SLOC effort to Western Europe or the Western Pacific in a
future conflict falls under this defensive effort
definition. For the areas in or near the potential battle
zone, defensive strategy elements will also apply to coastal
maritime facilities and waters surrounding the NATO and
Pacific region allies.^ The best solution toward ensuring
minimal defensive strategy requirements is a sound and
^This element of the coastal defense also applies to US
possessions and outlying bases on the territory of allies,
and must also be explored in an expanded Maritime Strategy.
This aspect remains worthy of further investigation, but due
to its complexity in international law, treaties and
negotiations, will not be addressed in this investigation.
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leak-proof forward posture. The former condition exists in
the present Maritime Strategy, but the later condition is
improbable in almost every potential conflict due to the
wide range of possibilities across which an aggressive
adversary may elect to act. Assuming that all 'leakers'—
early deployed forces (which may be vast in numbers or
small) , stragglers, special interdiction mission forces, or
retiring forces, can be dispatched by Western reserve
elements is at best wishful thinking. Even plans to shadow
all out-of-area Soviet forces in periods of escalating
tensions, and then terminate them at the inception of the
conflict, is an increasingly demanding task considering the
magnitude of operational units the Soviet Navy could muster
for itself in a crisis situation. Soviet strategic plans
probably also realize the obvious and are geared toward
denial of targeting actions in a superpower crisis,
targeting which comes easier to Western forces in peaceful
times.
Therefore, defensive considerations within a broader
Maritime Strategy will envision the desire of an potential
adversary to somehow impede the flow of manpower and
material necessary to support forward posture operations.
Another defensive consideration is the preparedness of
reserve forces to deal with the spectrum of likely aggressor
interdiction forces, leakers, or pre-positioned strategic
attack forces. The effectiveness of these forces in
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sustaining the rear of the forward deployed forces of the
West, will permit the employment of forces for achieving the
objectives of the existing strategy, without having national
decisionmakers and specified/unified commanders worry as
much about the action in their flanks and rear.
C. SLA-SLCM DEFENSIVE STRATEGY ELEMENTS
Specific Maritime Strategy defensive considerations can
be delineated in the case of meeting the emerging Soviet
SLA-SLCM threats. Foremost, the expenditure of scarce
resources, should be gauged to match and negate the
magnitude of the SLA-SLCM threat as more evidence of Soviet
SLCM operations is analyzed in the West, and employment and
deployment potential is understood and confirmed. But,
planning for the likely possibility of a soon-if-not-already
operational SS-NX-21 threat, and a potential future SS-NX-24
threat, can and must be initiated now as part of the
defensive element of the Maritime Strategy. This planning
consideration must account for possible Soviet military
employment of the SLA-SLCMs in the variety of situations
already mentioned, and facilitate a broad range of options
for decisionmakers along with prompting tactical
considerations on countering the launch platforms and the
weapons themselves. For submarine-launched, land-attack
cruise-missiles, first this encompasses considerations of
strategic warning and defense against low-flying
air-breathing weapons, and reaction possibilities to attacks
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upon vital coastal naval facilities, war industry or
strategic forces; second, these threats necessitate
discussion and maritime planning in near-coast to mid-ocean
ASW, and coastal air-defense measures.
So, a forward posture is not without its hazards, which
can be overcome in the proper planning and foresight in
naval preparedness of an offensive and defensive nature, but
requires caution in the faith and trust placed in all
assumptions of the desired or expected conduct of the future
conflict.
The key assumptions in the present Maritime Strategy
(which impact the way we respond to the advent of the Soviet
SLA-SLCM weapons) , are first, the determination to contain
any hostilities at the conventional level and prevent
escalation to nuclear weapons employment. This uncertainty
of nuclear escalation has a multi-faceted effect in parallel
strategic dilemmas of the use of nuclear weapons in the land
portion of a possible conflict—what boundaries separate
cheater, limited and mass employment short of a general
exchange; and of how the use of nuclear weapons in one realm
of battle will impact on their use in the maritime portion.^
^The US has made clear that the employment of nuclear
weapons ashore is not necessarily seperate from their
employment at-sea, and vis-versa. Thus, Soviet employment
of nuclear weapons from a perceived advantage in the
'strategic nuclear balance' may meet with a dissimilar or
unexpected response from the West. The aim in the Maritime
Strategy stands as to make escalation to nuclear weapons an
unattractive option as the Soviets evaluate the nuclear
equation. See Adm. James D. Watkins, "The Maritime
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The associated considerations relevant to this issue are
those questions regarding the timing, intentions, scope and
interrelationships of nuclear weapons employment by the
principle adversary, the Soviets. Their actual
determination of when's, where 's, and how much will probably
drastically alter preconceived Western notions and designs
on the conduct of the near term or long distant conflict, if
and how nuclear weapons are employed at all.
Another assumption is the debate over the amount of
reaction time the West will have to muster forces for a
response to any aggression. This is a vast subject in
itself, spanning many years of altering individual and
governmental opinions on the likelihood, form, magnitude and
success potential of a Soviet surprise action, or a
decapitation strike. While not the focus here, the question
of available reaction time is persistent, from responding to
a 'first-salvo' type of Soviet action and having sufficient
survivability to carry-on the fight, to the question of the
period of strategic attack warning, a debate in itself.
The reliability, survivability, connectivity and
responsiveness of our joint operations planning is another
guarded assumption. Widely recognized as needing
intensified efforts, joint services planning and readiness
has received larger efforts in recent years. However, under




the National Security Strategy tasking for the nations
defense, the documentation by which the other services act
reflect less 'jointness' and inter-operability than depicted
in the present Maritime Strategy.^
A factor which receives relatively little attention in
the current version of the Maritime Strategy, is the con-
sideration of attrition to and sustainability of forward
tempo operations. As the strategy continues to evolve, this
issue is surely to be addressed. One assumption is that
attrition will be of little impact since the battle may be
short, only a reminder of the events of 7 December, 1941
need enlighten Western planners the potential losses in a
short spell of time. At the opposite end of the spectrum
concerning the duration of a conflict with the Soviets, is
the threat to prolong the conflict, as outlined in the
current Maritime Strategy. The grand strategy pursued by
the Soviets—characteristically aimed towards a brief, and
decisive battle resulting in their quick victory via a
combined arms effort, and the ability of Lhe allies—be they
^Little evidence of Army-Navy interoperability is
revealed in the Army field manual, while recognizing the
maritime nature of the NATO regions, and therefore
indicating an understanding on the necessity of maritime
supremacy and the interactive roles of the Army and the Navy
in a defense of Europe. See the US Army manual, pp. 1-17,
Operations CFM 100-5)
. (Washington, D. C. : Department of the
Army, 1982) . A similar situation exists with the tone in
the chief US Air Force planning and guidance document, see
pp. 1-3, 2-15, and 3-5, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the
United States Air Force fAFM 1-1) . (Washington, D.C.
:
Department of the Air Force, 1984)
.
96
Pacific or Atlantic, to sustain a protracted conflict and
turn the battle against the Soviets are two major contri-
butors to deciding the tenure of the conflict, i.e.,
escalation is not only measured by the intensity and
location of the conflict, but also by its duration in time.^
With the objective of posing a protracted conflict to
Soviet strategic military leadership a fundamental in the
Maritime Strategy, flexible and broad sustainability and
limiting attrition are paramount to achieving the strategy's
goals. Both the magnitude of the conflicts attrition for
both opponents, and the capability to maintain operations
despite the ebb and flow of the battle are largely unknown,
and must receive consideration rather than being ignored.
If the future conflict is a ' come-as-you-are ' type as many
believe it may be, the readiness and endurance of Western
^Marshall N. Ogarkov elaborates on this revision in
Soviet 'warfighting style,' in his recent speach of 1982,
saying that current conditions have led to nuclear weapons
having an "influence on the achievement of strategic and
military-political war aims and objectives." See his trans-
lated speach in Foreign Broadcast Information Service
document JPRS L/10412, 25 March 1982, p. 25. Also, Marshall
Ogarkov mentions this aspect of rpesent conditions of war
implying Soviet consideration of and preparation for a
solely conventional conflict in a later interview, saying
"it becomes impossible to destroy the enemy's systems with a
single strike. ..." The Marshall goes on to assess the
use of nuclear weapons, and evolves the thought that
failings in the employment of nuclear weapons can be offset
by "sharply increas[ing] the destructive potential of
conventional weapons, bringing them closer ... to weapons
of mass destruction. ..." See the interview translation
in FBIS translation. Vol. 3, No. 91, USSR National Affairs.
Political & Social Developments , p. R19.
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maritime forces is of primary importance, as replenishment
and reinforcement may be longer in coming than expected.
These assumptions all effect defensive portions of a
revised Maritime Strategy as well as offensive. The nuclear
threshold and escalation control factors are foremost
aspects relevant to the possible employment of the new
SLA-SLCMs by the Soviets, especially if the estimation of a
solely nuclear capability is a reality. If the SLA-SLCMs
are deployed against the West, and the coasts of the US, the
defensive preparedness for countering them will rely largely
on warning and counter-measures reaction times. Further,
the interoperability, and joint response coordination in
countering the potential threat of Soviet SLA-SLCM systems
between the major US service components and with other
services especially the Coast Guard. Our ability to
maintain the SLOCs despite possible attacks against our
coastal maritime facilities relates directly to the
endurance of our forward posture forces, on land, in the
skies, and on the seas.
Therefore, the readiness of our reserve forces, and the
capability of our sister service, the Coast Guard, are
paramount in effectively preparing for the possibility of an
existing or soon-to-be Soviet SLA-SLCM threat. Also, the
capability of the US air defense network to detect the SLCMs
once inbound is critical in providing needed reaction time.
With respect to our reserves, not only naval ASW and AAW
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forces are involved, but also Air Force and National Guard.
Preparedness by these national defense elements is also
crucial in countering incoming low-flying, air-breathing
conventional or nuclear weapons, along with detection and
tracking capabilities able to handle the SLCMs. With the
Coast Guard, their role in coastal defense and harbor
protection is clearly projected in the Maritime Strategy of
today, in their Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ)
responsibilities. The MDZ program, if considered more
relevant in our broader Maritime Strategy, will be able to
aid in negating the potential impact of SLCM attacks on our
harbors, maritime industry and inter-war logistics. [Ref.
20:p. 5]
The ability of these military forces and organizations
to execute their already important tasks in wartime, plus
maintain a capability to negate a SLA-SLCM threat, requires
special attention to US Navy reaction in planning, training
and material readiness, along with joint services efforts in
the same vain, to counter the future SLCM hazard. The
present national military debate over the allocation of
resources within the Air Defense Initiative (ADI) is
directly related to our future preparedness to meet a
SLA-SLCM threat. The Navy's role in this effort can mean
the difference between a readiness state where a SLA-SLCM
attack can be effectively countered, or a continuance of the
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V. SLA-SLCM RESPONSES: TODAY. TOMORROW AND BEYOND
A. A STARTING POINT
To evaluate the Soviet SLA-SLCM threat, and then to
decide on a suitable, feasible and acceptable response
requires commitment from the highest levels of the defense
and political establishment. The high prioritization that
the defense of the territorial US and Northern Hemisphere
already have in the outlook of our defense planners is
readily evident in our present defense policies. Secretary
of Defense Weinberger noted the importance of defense of the
Western Hemisphere in his recent documentation to the US
Congress on the upcoming fiscal year defense plan:
The highest priority in U.S. defense planning
is accorded to the defense of North America, the
contiguous Caribbean Basin, and the adjoining
sea and air routes that are the lifeline of
American trade. [Ref. 22 :p. 266]
With this presumption, and the analysis of those threats
posed to the US and her allies, our present National
Security Objectives have been formulated. As previously
noted, the President also assigns the highest value to the
defense of America, as evidenced in his statements in this
year's National Security Strateqv of the United States
[Ref. 23].
A key point is the recognition of the threat variety
which the Soviets present in global military competition.
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with all this in mind, to assume that their SLA-SLCM capab-
ility, which will be a threat to the continental US, is
still a long off, may be a false and dangerous assumption.
Rather, prudent planning and enacting of response measures
should take place now, instead of after the threat has
gained so much momentum that the West's ability to counter
SLA-SLCMs put us in a perilous state—one militarily
advantageous to the Soviets. This planning can begin within
the guiding framework for our maritime capabilities, the
Maritime Strategy. A broader strategy, encompassing and
meeting the requirement of CONUS defense and promoting a
strong forward offensive posture is a better means of
ensuring national security objectives and meeting those of a
maritime nature.
Intelligence analysis on the emerging Soviet SLCMs
focused more within a predictive nature and promoting the
evaluation of the utility of the SLA-SLCM systems to Soviet
strategic planners, will support rational, prudent and
timely political-military decisions in the West, rather than
just assessing and monitoring the state of the system's
progress. This form of analysis can pace the Western
reaction to the systems, and allow timely response should
the systems assume a heightened status in the Soviet forces
structure of the future. This analysis direction can
support the new defensive element in a broad Maritime
Strategy on the Soviet SLA-SLCMs issue, and foirm the impetus
102
for reactive elements and thought in the strategies of our
sister services.
The response to the present SLA-SLCM situation requires
both foresight and caution against over-reaction. A key
element in this proposed wisdom is the realization of the
manner in which the Soviets have historically utilized their
military might in confronting the Western 'threat to the
motherland. ' This mindset is well expressed by other anal-
ysts, who note that in the absence of superiority at sea,
the Soviets have constructed naval forces capable of achiev-
ing victory over Western naval forces by "means of inventive
employment of limited assets," wherein the Soviets utilize
combined, concentrated sea-going forces and weapons in a
surprise manner so as to saturate and confuse an enemy's air
defenses and thus ensure penetration to the target. '
In observing Soviet military growth, the West has also
noted both a declaratory and operational recognition by the
Soviets of the necessity for power-projection capabilities
[Ref. 24]. One view on the evolution of SLA-SLCMs aside from
^This point is visited earlier in the analysis of
Soviet style of military operations, and is pointed out
again here to reenforce the idea that the SLA-SLCMs
considered in this investigation are potentially but one
means which the Soviet strategic planners aim to utilize in
a future attack on Western territory. McCormick and Miller
note this rationale in their analysis on Soviet use of
nuclear weapons at sea (see G.H. McCormick and M.E. Miller,
"American Seapower at Risk: Nuclear weapons in Soviet Naval
Planning," ORBIS, Summer 1981), however the premise is
universal across all forms of Soviet military actions,
including potential attack on US ports, maritime facilities,
strategic forces or C-^I locations utilizing SLA-SLCMs.
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those promoted earlier, is the possibility that these
systems are an intermediate solution to a strategic power-
projection capability which the Soviets desire and are
pursuing in their own aircraft carrier program. If correct,
this may indicate the Soviets are moving towards a similar
power projection naval posture to that maintained by the US,
where their targets are third world regions, crisis areas
where they must confront US naval air power-projection
forces, or just the attainment of another means in their
ability to confront an enemy with a multi-dimension attack
threat so as to achieve ultimate victory. As noted earlier.
Key targets in a future military confrontation between East
and West will surely include Western naval bases, ports and
harbors, maritime industry facilities, and probably US and
Western naval C-^I facilities such as ocean surveillance
installations located around the globe.
So, the form of threat is of major importance in
understanding how the Soviet navy and/or Soviet strategic
planners may utilize their SLA-SLCM capability. For the
Western assessment and response, the threat must be dealt
with today as we know it, and contingency responses for a
range of possible Soviet SLA-SLCM employments must be
evaluated for the future. The response for today fits well
within the guidelines of our present national security
objectives, and in the Maritime Strategy which seeks to
fulfill those objectives. A Maritime Strategy of a broader
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scope as posed here will include considerations of CONUS
defense, research into future means to counter emerging
Soviet capabilities, and continuous review of present
abilities to meet the full range of threats which present
themselves, in addition to guiding the forward posture
presently planned for our naval forces in wartime.
The aspect of CONUS defense must also stretch into the
planning and force structure of our sister services, the Air
Force, Army and Coast Guard. While the insular oceans will
assist in protecting US territory while the US fleet com-
manders position and utilize their forces in support of and
in conjunction with the other services, in the North
Atlantic and Pacific, these commanders must not overlook
their rear flanks while projecting power into embattled
areas and attempting to contain and neutralize the Soviet
naval forces. In wartime, the Maritime Defense Zone
Commanders will act under the Fleet C-in-C's to defend the
coasts of North America and our vital sea routes. But,
these elements of our national defense forces must also cope
with requirements of counter-mine-warfare, counter-
subversive actions, and convoy preparation and escort while
meeting the aforementioned demands. Hence, MDZ Commanders
need to be fully supported, as they guarantee the support
lifelines which will keep our forward forces in action. The
preparedness and material readiness of the forces allocated
to MDZ Commanders will greatly contribute to an effective
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and feasible forward posture planned in our present Maritime
Strategy, in addition to ensuring the prime national
security objective, defense.
The present threat potential of Soviet SLA-SLCMs being
accommodated under this broader maritime plan, our attention
must then be devoted to the future and possible implications
of the Soviets realizing a fully operational SLA-SLCM
capability in both their SS-NX-21 and SS-NX-24 systems. As
already noted, the systems are characteristically different,
and if considered alone or with other forces in a potential
Soviet aggression against CONUS or allied maritime entities,
pose threats requiring a broader range of responses to
ensure they are successfully negated.
Reacting to these potential intruders into our airspace
and near our shores, will require advanced detection,
tracking and countering means in the coming years. The
defense of CONUS airspace due to revitalized Soviet ALCM and
SLCM threats has not gone unnoticed by the present US
defense establishment. The current defense secretary notes
this threat aspect in his annual report to the Congress for
the fiscal year 1988, saying "Long-range Soviet cruise-
missiles pose an increasingly serious air-defense challenge"
[Ref. 22:p. 213]. He goes on to note that to respond to
this problem in defense, that the US is updating its
air-defense radars and interceptor forces. Complemen- tary
to our SDI efforts in examining potential means to negate
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the threat posed in ballistic missiles, the present
strategic modernization programs stretch to include a
"parallel program . . . examining advanced air-defense con-
cepts" [Ref. 22:p. 203]. This Air Defense Initiative (ADI)
currently in progress evidently has as its charter to
improve on current US air warning and detection capabilities
while increasing the effectiveness of our weapons systems to
counter the growing range of air-breathing strategic
threats. The US Navy has many assets which will be at risk
from these threats, in addition to the vulnerability posed
to our nation's strategic arsenal and C^ networks. The ADI
efforts with respect to maritime related activities, the
defense of ports, bases and SLOCs, are directly compatible
with existing and future US Navy efforts in ASW and AAW.
The progress of the US defense establishment to effectively
meet the defense requirements for the North American
land-mass, are inexorably linked to the participation of US
naval forces, and of allied naval ASW and AAW capabilities
in the protection of Western Europe or the Pacific. The US
Navy's level of participation in the current ADI program
will determine in part how effective this defense of our
boarders and shores is in the future, and therefore how
feasible the pursuit of a forward offensive maritime posture
will be in wartime.
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B. MARITIME DEFENSE ZONES: READY OR NOT?
Dealing with the SLA-SLCM threat that confronts us
today, is always the place to start when confronting a
heretofore partly neglected planning problem. ^ Earlier
concerns with coastal defense were accommodated under the
responsibilities of Naval Sea Frontier Commands, until their
dissolution in the mid-seventies. From then until the mid
1980 's, the responsibilities for coastal defense fell upon
individual naval districts and then on base commanders.
Maritime Defense Zones and their Commanders assumed these
missions in 1984, under their respective fleet C-in-C's,
currently planning, coordinating and controlling wartime
operations of CONUS shores and SLOC defense. Utilizing
active and reserve maritime forces as delineated in the
Navy's 'Total Force Mix' concept, these MDZ Commanders are
supposed to draw on mobilized forces in time of crisis to
effect harbor protection, coastal defense, convoy port
break-out actions and defense of SLOCs. [Ref. 25]
^The coastal defense problem for the United States
wained in the late sixties and seventies as the threat of
strategic bomber attack was userped by the threat from
strategic ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) . This
"atrophy" of our naval efforts with respect to coastal
defense in the van of increased emphasis on forward and
power projection is evident in our current capabilities and
declared priorities. The decline has not gone unnoticed,
even with regard to detection capabilities now important in
the task of drug-interdiction along our coasts. See "Customs
or Coast Guard?" by RADM. R. Young, et al., in Proceedings .
Vol. 113, No. 8, August, 1987, (Annapolis: US Naval
Institute Press, 1987), p. 71.
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Presently the operational outlook concerning Soviet
SLA-SLCMs, especially the SS-NX-21, is a acceptance of their
existence with a vague understanding of how they may be
employed while being unsure of the extent of operability
possessed by the Soviets.-^ As a result, while we monitor
the growth of the system, and that of its kin, the SS-NX-24,
little is done to prepare to counteract the potential of the
threat. Within the context of the present Maritime
Strategy, fighting sea-going assets are limited and destined
for forward operations in the event of crisis or
hostilities. While surging forward to meet and hopefully
contain the Soviet maritime forces, the tasks of CONUS
coastal defense and initial SLOC security fall on the
shoulders of the MDZ Commanders and the smaller force
allocated to them. If any Soviet SLA-SLCM (and ALCM) effort
is forthcoming in the future, the Western aim is to kill the
launch platforms prior to their launch of weapons against
friendly forces. This is a succinct element of the forward
posture posed for forward forces in the current Maritime
^The attitude described here was noted in interviews
with current US Navy personnel engaged in active execution
of the Maritime Strategy and all of the associated naval
responsibilities in both peace-time and crisis situations.
Most of these senior officers projected that the potential
Soviet naval SLA-SLCM threat, if encountered, would
hopefully be dealt with at the inception of hostilities by
terminating the weapons launch platforms. It was noted that
while this planned response was the most logical, it might
require trailing efforts of a substantial size during crisis
tensions escalation, and that trailing in itself was a
provoking action along with a drain on forces which might be
needed elsewhere.
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strategy, and would be the same in an extended form of a
broader Maritime Strategy to take into account CONUS defense
and SLOC requirements.^
Still, the layered air-defense approach is not fool-
proof, and gaps may allow penetration which inner-zone
defenses should counter.^ This theory also applies directly
to the corralling of Soviet submarines in waters far from
the US, some of which may be designated SLA-SLCM shooters in
Soviet plans for a future conflict. The potential of some
submarines getting through even a staunch NATO/US ASW net is
recognized in both the Navy and the Defense Department,
where in addressing ASW capabilities the defense secretary
correctly notes, "Even under the most favorable circum-
stances . . . some submarines would escape our forward
^The current Maritime Strategy proposes to negate the
strike potential of Soviet missiles by attempting to kill
all launch platforms before they are within shooting range
of their targets. "The overriding goal is to counter the
Soviet's missile-launching platforms, to shoot the archer
before he releases his arrows," according to then CNO
Admiral James D. Watkins. ("The Maritime Strategy," supple-
ment to the US Naval Institute's Proceedings . January, 1986,
p. 12.) This premise applies not only to the layered
defense concept for battle-groups and task-forces, but also
to air-defense of CONUS and allied territory.
^The 'inner-zone' defenses can consist of presently
available means, such as the Army's HAWK missiles, modified
to counter cruise-missiles. These proven weapons could
become a current asset to today's MDZ Commanders. Future
evolutions in surface-to-air weapons would enhance this
inner-zone capability, and a cooperative plan between the
Army and Navy/Coast Guard on utilizing available systems
would enable a more effective MDZ defense today and in the
future, against SLA-SLCMs and other similar threats from the
seas.
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sweeps." [Ref. 22: p. 175] From this, one deduction is that
the CONUS air-defense and shore protection problem begins
with the mid-ocean and near-coast ASW problem.
US Navy ASW support for MDZ Commanders in this realm
falls under actions of maritime patrol air power (MPA) in
shore-based ASW capable aircraft to trail and negate any
' leakers • which may skirt or evade Western submarine screens
in the North Atlantic and outside Soviet Pacific submarine
havens. Other measures noted are surveillance capabilities
in our present and growing TAGOS Surveillance Towed-Array
Sonar System (SURTASS) vessels, and the newer fixed position
detection and tracking devices such as the Fixed Distributed
Surveillance System (FDS) [Ref. 22:p. 176].
MDZ Commanders are confronted by both material con-
straints due to the focus of the present Maritime Strategy
on solely forward operation, and by other factors such as
geography. On the CONUS East coast, a continental shelf
provides shallow-water ASW problems,^ while the deeper
waters off the pacific coastline offer yet another set of
physical constraints on submarine prosecution. A further
aspect of this detection and warning ability is the
^The aspect of shallow-water ASW is a much-visited
aspect of confronting the ever-growing Soviet submarine
force. It encomapsses considerations of detection measures,
and capable weapons to effect kills in this different
oceanographic region, along with potential threat forms of
diesel powered subs, mine warfare, and now SLA-SLCM shooters
off the coasts of the US and her allies. See LCDR James J.
O'Keefe, "Muddy Waters and the Iron Depth Charge," Naval War
College Review . January-February 1984, pp. 14-17.
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integration of MDZ Commanders into the US Navy ' s own command
center system, so coastal defense can receive timely
intelligence and operational information. Modernization in
MDZ C-^I capabilities can be considered as a requirement for
effective ASW and AAW efforts in support of coastal defense
requirements and could be represented as such under improve-
ments designated for support in future ADI and strategic
defense efforts.
While present US fleet C-in-C's consider the Soviet SSBN
force as a primary target, and assume from predictions that
the number of Soviet out-of-area naval units will be small,
an unexpected surge, or pre-deployment to enable surprise
attacks or actions of military-political leverage may catch
present force dispositions unprepared. Assuming that
currently designated Naval Reserve Force (NRF) elements such
as existing ASW vessels, even with planned augmentation of
26 newer FFG-7 and FF-1052 class vessels by 1990, and the 13
present MPA reserve squadrons can handle the myriad of tasks
apart from those of forward defense and power projection may
be short-sighted in light of a potential SLA-SLCM capability
the Soviets may soon have [Ref. 22:p. 166]. Improvement
efforts posed under strategic defenses modernization could
include bettering the ASW capabilities of these forces and
those assigned to MDZ Commanders whose missions bear the
leading edge in CONUS air-defense and shoreline protection,
in addition to advanced technology research efforts into
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better capabilities to detect and counter air-breathing
threats of today and tomorrow.
To match the required material capabilities, a training
and readiness program in near-coast ASW and AAW would
sharpen the capability of these forces to counter any future
SLCMALCM threats if they occur, and broaden their capability
to effectively replace attrited units if needed, in forward
operations where ASW and AAW are primary missions of battle-
group operations. MPA, NRF and other active force elements
such as those in-port or in non-deployment status could
exercise near-coastal ASW and AAW defense readiness, and
thereby contribute to an increased defense preparedness
against a possible surprise attack. In conjunction with
strategic defense efforts resulting from SDI, these defense
measures will boost our overall national capability, and
further alter the military equation in favor of the West.
Similar allied efforts to demonstrate resolve at defense
along their shores, will enhance the credibility of NATO
resolve against the possibility of Soviet continental and/or
maritime aggression.
Another possible force under consideration by future-
oriented US naval planners and directly applicable to
augmenting the readiness of our MDZ forces, is the potential
utility in coastal defense of airships. Not seen in the
realm of Naval Aviation since the early 1960 's, these units
could provide capable platforms for improved long-range
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detection and warning radars currently envisioned as
products of our ADI and strategic defense modernization
efforts, and would provide the MDZ Commander with better
interim detection and tracking capabilities against SLCM
threats until our national air-defense radar improvements
such as UVIS and OTH-B are on-line. Progress in the
evolution of these platforms and their associated warning
capabilities could then be refocused on aiding forward
operational units. A highly sensitive radar could provide
effective detection and warning against the low-cross-
section radar signature of small SLCMs like the SS-NX-21,
and an efficient high-altitude tracking radar like that
employed on AWACS aircraft could provide MDZ detailed
airships with a detection capability against the faster
SS-NX-24, if and when that system goes operational.^
The final capability noted in the planned and ongoing
modernization of our strategic defenses is that of the
improvement of interceptor forces [Ref. 22:p. 214]. Along
with this needed effort, should go measures to provide NRF
^The relationship of the Navy today and the utility of
airships is visited in many recent discussions in naval
literature. See "Standby to Weigh-Off" by F. Montarelli, in
US Naval Institute's Proceedings . Vol. Ill, No. 9, September
1985, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1985), pp. 111-113,
and a subsequent commentary by CDR J.E.Jackson, USN, in
Proceedings . Vol. Ill, No. 11, November 1985, p. 148,
concerning application of airship-borne radar in detecting
cruise-missiles. Notably, the US Navy has aaccepted this
idea in its basic form, awarding research contracts for
airship aircraft and radar systems in 1985/86. See Proceed-
ings, Vol. 112, No. 5, May 1986, p. 72.
114
ships and aircraft with weapons capable of engaging SLCMs
once detected, as the potential of missing some SLA-SLCM
shooters in ASW efforts exists. MPA aircraft should be able
to exert both offensive ASW efforts against possible SLCM
shooters in mid and near-coastal ocean regions, along with
AAW capabilities to counter any SLCMs fired near their
positions. NRF vessels operating near naval bases, staging
for convoys or in mine-counter-warfare efforts can provide
valuable AAW protection near these facilities if appropr-
iately equipped.
The most logical and best defense would not consist of
special capabilities specifically for defense, but rather
available weapons and technologies can provide for a layered
defense along the coasts much as a layered defense is
utilized in AAW defense of a carrier-battlegroup. The
layers would be of both active and passive defense weapons,
and innovative systems such as those that catch low-flying
air-breathing targets, electronic jamming and false-signal
devices, or systems to negate the SLA-SLCM 'TERCOM' navigat-
ional capability are available now and some are lower in
cost than active anti-missile weapons.
Detection and tracking capabilities can also be adapted
from other assets, research might prove the capability of
existing space-based IR detection platforms presently used
in detection of intercontinental ballistic missiles for the
detection of the initial stages of a SLCM booster flight.
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Pin-point location at the greatest distance from the coasts
which MDZ Commanders must defend will provide critical
reaction time and efficient utilization and coordination of
available assets to counter the incoming SLCMs.
Another means for expanding the capabilities of the MDZ
Commanders is to utilize the islands and extremities of the
continental US to place the initial detection and tracking
systems, and the first line of the inner-defense weapons.
Placement of radars on the outlying islands of the US, i.e.,
Block Island off New York, Bermuda, the Keys off Florida, or
San Clemente off San Diego provide ideal forward deployment
areas for our inner-defense units, and would in many cases
provide the MDZ Commander (s) with additional time to respond
to SLA-SLCM targets upon reaching our coasts.^
Providing the MDZ Commanders with forces capable of
survivable and effective SLCM countermeasures will ensure
that the CONUS coasts remain free of hostile actions that
may impede logistical support for forward operating forces,
or necessitate the fall-back of a portion of these forces
during a conflict to deal with threats in home waters. The
threat posed in the present Soviet SLA-SLCM capability, can
be addressed in a Maritime Strategy that also envisions a
^The concept of the inner-defense in a revitalized MDZ
plan utilizing outlying-island posted systems may be applied
against the US and allies if the Soviets were to deploy
their land-based varient of the current generation
cruise-missiles near to CONUS. A likely location for such
action may be pro-Soviet territory in the Carribean Basin.
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role in CONUS defense and shore protection as well as
forward offensive operations. Current force posture should
not be sacrificed at the expense of this attention to
defense in the improved Maritime Strategy. Rather,
strategic defense modernization efforts should recognize the
direct tie between effective CONUS air-defense and
territorial protection and the ASW and AAW missions of the
existing maritime MDZ forces. Inclusion of these forces in
planned strategic defense improvement expenditures will
ensure a complete and effective multi-dimensional defense
capability. This realization can occur without sacrificing
continued US Navy forward posture efforts in meeting the
ever-growing capabilities of an ever-expanding Soviet Navy.
Present air-defense capabilities begin with negating the
threat platforms as far out from CONUS as possible, then
continue with effective defensive forces of the revitalized
capabilities our MDZ commanders can have with current
technology and future improvements. Providing a secure
rear-area, and also ensuring the safety of US territory from
attack either preemptive, or inter-war, will enable a more
effective forward-based maritime posture. Efforts today can
counter the Soviet SLA-SLCM threat as we currently know it,
and efforts in future planning can anticipate and negate the
threat from the SLA-SLCM systems of tomorrow. A key factor
in planning against the future SLCM problem exists in the
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us Navy's position on the Air Defense Initiative (ADI) , and
the level of participcttion the Navy is willing to assume.
C. COUNTERING THE SLA-SLCM IN THE FUTURE: ADI AND THE NAVY
The reaction to a SLA-SLCM threat, of the present
magnitude, or of some larger scale in the future, requires
forward planning and associated actions along the course of
those previously charted in a revised broad Maritime Strat-
egy. Other means and measures which may avail themselves to
the ^ir-defense and shore protection missions which Soviet
SLA-SLCMs necessitate are being investigated now under the
umbrella coverage of the Air Defense Initiative (ADI) . The
part that today's US Navy is willing to take in this future-
looking program will directly impact on the readiness of the
navy to meet emerging threats, including SLA-SLCMs and their
future kin.
The risks which future technology and plans seek to
counter is well recognized in the West and in the US defense
plans for regional security. The defense of North American
air-space and territory is directly related to risk
perceived in " . . . Soviet advancements in ballistic
missiles, missile-carrying submarines, bombers, and
long-range cruise-missiles." The required response promoted
in the current US Defense Department posture includes
continued US-Canada joint NORAD efforts, surveillance and
air-defense modernization, and "progressive research in
advanced technologies for aerospace defense . . . required
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to maintain the security of North America." [Ref. 22: p.
2 68] This effort is projected as complementing the efforts
in strategic defense programs, and goals of improved
capabilities overshadow partial changes according to Defense
Department posturing—"Analogous to the SDI's goals for
ballistic missile defense, we seek to negate the enormous
Soviet investments in cruise missiles and new bombers"
[Ref. 22:p. 214]. The technological emphasis promoted in
this counter cruise-missile effort includes missiles for
countering cruise-missiles, armed surveillance planes, and
survivable and better command and control systems.
For the US Navy, the first area of technology focus, in
long-range missiles to counter cruise-missiles, efforts to
procure advanced versions of the SM-2 missile lead the way!
Directed RTD&E for this system in improving its
compatibility with the MK 13 missile launcher of FFG-7 class
MDZ mission NRF vessels will greatly improve their
air-defense capability and therefore their utility in a
anti-SLA-SLCM role. The next area addressed is research
into the potential for armed surveillance aircraft, and the
MPA aircraft assigned to MDZ commanders should be equipped
with a capable air-to-air weapon for destroying Soviet
strategic land-attack cruise-missiles. In coordinated
interaction with airship-borne detection and tracking
platforms, these platforms with a new AAW capability against
the subsonic low-flying SLCM systems like the Soviet
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SS-NX-21 could form an outer-to-mid layer air-defense zone
to hinder the penetration of SLA-SLCMs.
The efforts to develop warning systems has yielded
efforts in land based radar units with improved capabilities
against low-flying air-breathing threats, however, speed
increases evident in the newer Soviet SS-NX-2 4 may negate
gains in crucial reaction time spans. Thus, the father away
from targets along the CONUS coasts the SLA-SLCM threat can
be engaged, the better the probability that successive
efforts to kill incoming threats will be successful. The
AAW capability of the revitalized CONUS defense platforms
must be matched by efforts to improve technological advances
in ASW.
While the SS-NX-21 SLCM has been test-fired from a
VICTOR III Soviet nuclear submarine, which is quieter than
other platforms, the potential exists in the unique inter-
operability of the SS-NX-21 system to be deployed in newer
and quieter classes of Soviet SSN and SSGN submarines. This
poses a ASW dilemma for the MDZ Commander as his ASW capable
vessels are limited, and ASW capable aircraft may be tasked
in regions father out from the coasts. Thus breakthroughs
in new acoustic capabilities, coupled with integration of
MDZ operations into US Navy ocean surveillance networks and
ASW modernized NRF vessels could make the difference between
capable shore protection, convoy escort and air-defense at
the perimeters of US ocean control . Improvements in the
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wide-area surveillance afforded in the Relocatable Over-the-
Horizon Radar (ROTHR) with their 1600 mile range capability,
to facilitate detection of small radar signature SLCMs, and
assignment of these ROTHR units to MDZ Commanders will pro-
vide a stop-gap measure until the advent of fully operation-
al CONUS and North American perimeter air-defense radar
networks [Ref. 22:p. 179]. These radars, such as the OTH-B
and NWS systems, are the modernization of the older Distant
Early Warning (DEW) line of strategic warning radars. The
Air Force manages both the emerging NWS system comprised of
13 long-range and 39 short-range radar sites along the
northern Canadian perimeter; and the OTH-B system which was
originally planned as a bomber detection system with capa-
bility out to 1800 miles employing ionosphere reflected
high-frequency radar energy, and will consist of 12 sixty-
degree sector radar units covering Alaska, the East and West
US coasts, and the Gulf coast when fully operational.^
^The improvements to surveillance and warning coverage
along the Northern US and Canadian boundry are noted by the
Defense Secretary in his current report to the Congress on
the defense posture, as measures to "provide complete
surveillance and warning coverage of all air-breathing
threats to North America." See the Defense Secretary's
Annual Report to the Congress: FY 88 . (Washington, D. C.
:
Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 238. Also, the ADI
program has not gone unnoticed in the open-press, as
presented in "New Radar Installations Promise 360-deg. Air
Defense Perimeter" in Aviation Week & Space Technology . 9
December, 1985, (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc. ,1985), p. 56;
"Air Defense Initiative Gets Off the Ground," by A. L.
Weeks, in Defense Science and Electronics , (Campbell, Ca.
:
Rush-Franklin Publishing, Inc. , 1987)
, pp. 15-16; and "Lock-
heed-Georgia Seeking Major Role in ADI Development," in
Aviation Week & Space Technology . 18 May, 1987, pp. 126-127;
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Thus ADI will play a major role in attempting to meet
defense challenges posed by continued Soviet military
efforts. The US Navy can take a range of positions on this
program, ranging from: isolationist and non-interactive,
which will leave the ADI effort largely in the control of
the Air Force, to a moderate stance by participating in
traditional maritime realms such as ASW and not pursuing new
technologies, to a fairly active role in ADI research and
development, and intertwining the resultant technology with
improvements and extensions in the scope of the Maritime
Strategy. Rear-area security, as a direct resultant of
potential future ADI successes, will promote the forward
posture premise that is key to victory in a naval encounter
and any continental conflict with the Soviets. ADI
potential advantages lie in being able to counter the
next-generation SLCMs, and submarines. Technology
advancements in warning and assessment systems, such as the
air-borne phased-array radar, and in engagement systems such
as the improved SM-2 missile can also enhance forward
offensive forces readiness.
Therefore an active and progressive US Navy role in the
evolution of ADI technology advances and spinoffs is both
necessary and desirable. A phased involvement might consist
of interaction in the areas of advanced ASW technologies and
and "Air Force Upgrading Radar Network," in Aviation Week &
Space Technology , Special Report: Modernizing Strategic
Forces, 16 June, 1980, pp. 96-99.
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weapons systems, AAW detection and destruction capabilities
against the broad range of air-breathing threats especially
those posed in SLA-SLCMs, and applications of existing
operational capabilities to ADI missions such as training in
coastal ASW and AAW defense and integration of MDZ force
elements into current operational information networks.
The threat to the continental US and northern hemi-
sphere, along with the capability SLCM systems provide the
Soviets of long-range strike abilities against the territory
of our allies make the incorporation of SLA-SLCM response
measures into our planning and operational readiness a must.
To neglect these emerging Soviet Weapons systems, because of
political implications such as arms control efforts, or
because of an absence of knowledge on the operational status
is to invite trouble at some future time when they are
employed against the West in concert with other Soviet
capabilities. Former Navy Secretary Lehman properly noted
the dilemma posed to Western naval planners in responding to
threats about which there are vague uncertainties or exten-
uating circumstances, as is the present SLA-SLCM threat,
saying:
We cannot afford profligacy in order to deter Soviet
aggression, neither, however, can we afford to spend
less than what is needed to defeat aggression. [Ref. 21]
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND A FUTURE COURSE
A. MEETING SOVIET MARITIME THREATS
The future of the US Navy is, beyond a doubt, tied to
the advances in technology. How the leadership of today's
and tomorrow's Navy utilize the talents of the West in
various technological technological fields is now and in the
future governed by the course charted in the Maritime
Strategy. As the US and its Western allies proceed along
paths colored as 'violent peace' in the geopolitical world,
the guidance this strategy provides concerning the conduct
of affairs on and near the seas will help determine if
Western confrontations with Eastern or other hostile forces
will be successful [Ref. 20:p. 5]. This ever-present
potential of aggression which the Eastern and especially
Soviet force posture promotes must be met and negated in
order for Western nations, lead by the US, to freely exist
and interact in social, political and economic ways. The
threat that the Soviet Union poses in its many forms of
nuclear weapons, and ambitious and continuous military
buildup, requires a persistent and credible counter from
Western societies, lead by the US. The emerging Soviet
strategic land-attack, submarine-launched cruise-missiles
upon which this investigation has focused are but one form
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in the multitude of weapons, which the Soviet armed forces
present against the US and allied Western nations.
The special attributes of these systems, both now in
their early stages of evolution and later in time, when they
may be fully developed and deployed, are their capabilities
to shorten the military variables of time and distance for
Soviet strategic planners. With the unresolved question of
the operational status of the SS-NX-21, and the portent of a
soon-to-be operational SS-NX-24, the planning and reaction
problems these systems pose to Western planners are many.
The response to Soviet SLA-SLCM's from the West and especi-
ally the US must be prompt, credible and effective along
with being a consistent element within the existing planning
guidance in effect today and their future derivations. The
SLA-SLCM response must also be a multi-service effort, all
contributing to the insured security for our territory and
citizens, and the best effort against the emerging Soviet
SLA-SLCMs will be a joint-nation effort involving Western
allies both European, Atlantic and Pacific.
As the rational response to the threat posed by these
cruise-missiles will involve Western air, surface, and
subsurface efforts, today's US Navy can best contribute to
the overall response program by effecting response
contributions along the line of traditional naval missions
such as in oceanic anti-air and anti-subsurface warfare.
Recognizing the potential of these systems in its planning.
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procurement and operational guidelines is the place for
naval leaders to begin, both in the US Navy and the naval
services of our allies. Today's Maritime Strategy is still
the best premise upon which to base Western naval response
to hostile actions by hostile nations, lead by the Soviets,
and by encompassing the aspect of US territorial defense
which the Soviet SLA-SLCM systems contest, this document can
effect a proper Western naval response.
The Soviet SLA-SLCM threat must be understood, which
involves not only monitoring the growth of these systems,
but also requires tracing their origins and hypothesizing
about their future and potential utilization by the Soviet
political-military hierarchy. This involves intelligence
gathering directed across a broad range of threat character-
istics including their military-economic progress and
history, their place in the employment rationale of Soviet
strategic planners and military leadership, and their
functional characteristics within the many missions which
Soviet naval units will be expected to carry-out in wartime.
Further, these systems must be evaluated for their potential
against existing and proposed US and Western air and sea
defenses. All aspects of the systems must be observed,
contrasted with existing similar threats, and evaluated
under the overall premise of judging what capabilities they
afford the Soviet strategic planners which were not there in
earlier strategic forces assessments. Only then, can the
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West successfully prepare a measured and credible response
to the present and future threat these SLA-SLCMs pose.
Reacting to the SLCM threat today is well within the
operational capability of the 600 ship Navy, starting with
guidance for such threats in an extended broad Maritime
Strategy. This must be under the assumption that US naval
forces can and must contribute to Western victory in a
conflict with the Soviets, both from the main direction of
forward offensive operations, and in the contributory
element of ensuring the security of the nation's coastlines,
ports, naval bases, maritime facilities and aiding in the
perimeter defense of the nation. A fulfilled maritime
defense posture of this sort could be encouraged in the
maritime planning of our allies, both NATO and Pacific, as
complimentary to military efforts ashore, and under the
premise of a complete framework for enabling the defense of
and maintaining the integrity of the alliance regions.
The effort to sustain a Western defense in the European
theater is not just a problem solved along the leading edge
of a confrontation zone, but involves defense and offensive
military actions throughout the depth of that zone. In
respect to the maritime portion of a future conflict, the
assumption that portions of the rear in this conflagration
will not require consideration is an improbability and as
such should receive a sizable portion of strategic and
tactical thought in Western planning and preparation. It is
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the actions in this rear region which will enable the
sustenance of forward Western naval operations, and a strong
maritime posture across the whole range of operations will
provide a strong contribution to efforts ashore.
B. THE PRESENT AND FUTURE SOVIET SLA-SLCM CHALLENGE
Drawing on the possible Soviet military-economic process
outlined earlier, the SS-NX-21 program appears to have
crossed the mark of the second developmental decision and to
be entering the third phase in the described hypothetical
acquisition cycle, that of a Soviet commitment to
large-scale production of the weapons. Now the main
consideration for the West are the questions of how fast
this production capability can be achieved, what force
stockpile size the Soviet military leadership has set as a
goal, and how these weapons will be deployed. Evaluating
these dilemmas is no small task, and Western naval planners
probably are already so engaged. Assets devoted to
monitoring the SLA-SLCM programs, the SS-NX-21 as it nears
operational deployment status, and the developing SS-NX-24
and its launch platforms, must be considerable and are
subject to constraints including possible Soviet overt
denial programing. These intelligence collection efforts
will enable Western naval planners to make reasonable
predictions as to the status today and employment in the
future of the SLA-SLCM systems.
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As noted by the former Soviet Viktor Suvorov in his
works on the interactions within the Soviet military
production and operational forces, a deliberate attempt to
apply deception, 'maskirovka, ' to military weapons and
systems may also apply to the SLA-SLCM programs under
consideration here [Ref. 26]. This type of effort will
further complicate and distort Western efforts to discern
Soviet intentions, progress, and capabilities regarding the
SS-NX-21 and SS-NX-24. Our limited information on these
systems may be a direct result of such efforts, and must be
taken into account when evaluating the current potential of
the SLCMs. For example, there may be the possibility that
the SS-NX-21 system, due to its interoperability afforded in
a capability to operate from standard Soviet naval torpedo
tubes, may have received special efforts by the Soviet
military to deny the West evidence of its operational state.
Having seen the system through to the point of probable
operational status, it may be wiser for Western naval
leadership to consider the system operational, the SS-N-21
instead of SS-NX-21, and effect appropriate responses to
counter the threat today.
A weak air-defense capability of this nation, like that
which has ensued since the decline in the threat from Soviet
strategic bombers in the sixties, may have prompted Soviet
military strategists to take advantage of the resulting
CONUS vulnerability and launch an effort to utilize the same
129
vulnerability to threaten the US, and alter their view of
the strategic balance even more in their favor. This would
explain the advent of the SLCM programs focused on here,
while The Soviets engaged in efforts in both SALT I and II,
and INF negotiations to limit cruise-missiles and their
strategic capabilities. The consideration of the ties
between overt Soviet positions and the advent of their
SLA-SLCM and their ALCM programs should weigh heavily in
overall analysis of their true intentions as to real stra-
tegic arms restraints, reductions or limitations. This
issue, the impact of Soviet strategic land-attack
cruise-missiles in superpower arms control negotiations, is
one worthy of further exploration in connection with the
future progress of the SS-NX-21 and SS-NX-24 programs, and
the analysis of Soviet intentions for these systems.
The aspect of the SS-NX-24 being a different sort of
SLCM, in its size, speed capability, and individual launch-
platform is also worth note, for they impart totally
different possibilities to the missile in the aforementioned
arms control dilemma, and also in the questions of
intentions and capabilities. This may be a system destined
as a new element in the Soviet strategic arsenal, in the
same way that SSBNs and SLBMs were earlier in the cold-war
years. It may also be the result of Soviet analysis of the
potential inherent in a realized American and Western SDI,
which would negate the overall strategic impact of the
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Soviet strategic Rocket Forces, even if only a partial
defense capability is achieved. The potential of SDI to
obstruct the strategic threat of ballistic missiles may have
prompted Soviet strategic planners to require weapons
capable of effectively holding-at-risk American strategic
assets, and with the weakened state of US continental
air-defenses, a credible strategic land-attack cruise-
missile force element, such as that possible with a force
mix of SS-NX-21 and SS-NX-24 systems.
The tie between the American strategic defense efforts
and the circumventing of the strategic threat necessity of a
solely ballistic missile force by the Soviets in SLA-SLCM
and ALCM programs is yet another facet of this topic worth
pursuit. Although many differing schools of thought have
existed within the US concerning the strategic defense of
the nation, our present course is plotted to achieve some
evolving form of ballistic missile defense. This charter
must not ignore the potential of other strategic threats
which our enemies may impose upon the West, and a
coordinated Air Defense effort can move the US and the West
toward a more secure geopolitical position through a true
defense-in-depth from strategic weapons. Ultimately,
defense against even space-based weapons may emerge as a
requirement in our national defense. An Air Defense effort
must parallel the Strategic Defense efforts in magnitude of
expenditure and attention, although if initiated today will
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surely lag the on-going SDI efforts, much as the threat
posed by air-breathing weapons lags far behind the evolved
ICBM/SLBM threat. If the Soviets continue at their present
pace of SLCM evolution, a lagging air-defense effort on the
part of the West is adequate; if the Soviet efforts enlarge
into a broader SLA-SLCM/ALCM/GLCM effort, a corresponding
increase in the magnitude of the Western ADI effort is
required.
The overriding point in objectively analyzing the status
of the Soviet SLCM programs today, and of the magnitude of
the strategic threat they pose to the US and our allies, is
that the systems are in-work—the SS-NX-21 possibly
operational, the SS-NX-24 not far behind—and that a major
Soviet military and political commitment was required to
achieve this. A response is justified based on the
rationale that Soviet military program commitments are not
easily or freely made without major reasons or strategic
cause. This is where Western analysis should be focused,
and responses to the threat potential, not just the system
capabilities are what is called for. This western response,
essentially maritime in scope, must be lead by the US Navy,
with a maritime plan and posture which reflects this.
Actions can be taken to strengthen the capabilities of
existing US naval forces and plans to cope with the
possibility of an operational Soviet SLA-SLCM threat, much
as the Soviets revitalized and modernized their own air and
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perimeter defenses in reaction to events such as the
evolution of a Western cruise-missile capability. Actions
can also be taken with respect to future air-breathing
threats, from hostile forces near to our shores, in forward
looking research programs like the ADI. The US Navy should
play a lead role in this program, as the first lines of
defense for the nation are in the fixed oceans, and the US
Navy's mission is inexorably tied to all military utility of
the seas. Promoting advanced air-defense technologies such
as, the utility of warning and detection airship platfonns
for MDZ commanders, better weapons capable of engaging SLCMs
in our active and NRF ships, and strengthened near-coast and
mid-ocean ASW capabilities— in detection, tracking and
killing Soviet SLCM shooters before they can approach North
American firing positions, is the emphasis which a pro-
active US Navy position on ADI can achieve.
C. MEETING THE SOVIET SLA-SLCM CHALLENGE TODAY
The capabilities to strengthen our present posture
against the possibility of attack by Soviet SLA-SLCMs exists
already in the types of forces the US Navy currently oper-
ates. From a broader prospective on coastal and near-shore
naval preparedness which defense considerations in an
extended Maritime Strategy will prompt, naval operations in
ASW and AAW can be expanded to meet threats in near-CONUS
regions as well as overseas in the 'Bear's backyard.'
Strengthening the status of these geographic missions will
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impart a follow-on elevation in the importance of existing
operational designs like the MDZ program. An evaluation of
the capability of Coast Guard elements to meet these
missions requirements may find a stronger active naval
presence required. National naval defense efforts in this
light should meet with more internal political and public
favor than solely forward offensive efforts of the past.
Training and readiness efforts can be adjusted toward
including preparations in coastal ASW and AAW, and fleet
C-in-C's planning and directions encompassing these warfare
considerations will strengthen the existing forward posture.
Interservice ties and coordinated joint service efforts
in traditional service warfare areas, between the Navy and
Air Farce especially, will become requisite for a credible
and effective air and sea-defense of the North American
shorelines. Actions today by the Navy to assume this
element of our national defense can ensure proper
consideration in allocation of defense funding for improved
effective defense measures, along with maintaining
sufficient forward postured naval capabilities.
Rather than devalue the necessity of forward forces,
which logically and militarily are the best means to meet
Soviet naval force aggression across the globe, the efforts
for perimeter defense of this nation must be seen as
separate and necessary, although operationally intertwined
with those forward forces elements. This premise applies to
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those efforts of the Navy and the other services, along with
the overriding consideration that operational forces of the
other services, especially land forces, will require secure
travel from embarkation to debarkation points in the
conflict theater, primarily a naval mission. Supported in
this light, and paralleled by the rising importance of
military air and sea-lift missions, CONUS coastal defense is
a necessary component in the conduct of military affairs
against any enemy, under the rationale that a secured
backing for a forward posture will better enable victory,
and termination of hostilities in a manner favorable to the
West.
Another modern aspect to future warfighting between the
superpowers is the element of space. With the high reliance
of both the Soviets and the West on space-based intelligence
collection and communications means, efforts on both sides
to deny the use of space-based assets will surely be
entwined in any future hostilities. The US Navy, as a major
consumer of satellite carried information in peace, and even
more so in war, must also help provide for the continuity of
these systems. An extended Maritime Strategy which included
coastal defense might promote inclusion of our present
space-launch facilities in the protected zones under MDZ
Commanders today, and also those space facilities of
tomorrow.
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The ability of MDZ Commanders to integrate into operat-
ional networks of naval forces is paramount for successful
conduct of coastal defense actions—air, surface and sub-
surface. The forces assigned to these 'theater' commanders
must be as capable and modern as those of front-line
elements if they are to meet the threat posed by Soviet
SLA-SLCMs and other hostile forces such as in counter-
minewarfare. The opponent, whether the Soviets or another,
should not be expected to allocate less capable weapons to
operations along the coasts of the US or Western Europe,
just because the main naval contest involving the most
modern assets is occurring elsewhere. This assumption
necessitates that forces assigned to these rear locations,
along with those in other zones like convoy escorts, should
also be suitably equipped. For MDZ forces, active and
reserve, this means improving on their ASW and AAW
capabilities, to meet all forms of expected Soviet weapons,
now including the potential threat from SLA-SLCMs. MPA
forces involved in Mid-ocean and near-coast ASW require
modernized aircraft as much as forward elements, as their
foes will be as capable as those in the North Atlantic, and
capabilities of NRF vessels to engage SLCMs and ALCMs should
be examined and corrected if deficient. This may enable
them to offset any potential gain Soviet planners may see in
attacking US shore establishments. Improvements in ocean
ASW long-range detection and tracking should be applied to
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near-coast regions as much as forward locations such as the
GIUK gap, to enable the forces responsible for defense and
sanitization of coastal naval areas to ensure the secure
staging and initiation of support convoys and task forces.
Further, improved ASW in the near-shore region contributes
to the effort to counter Soviet forward deployed strategic
forces such as SSBNs and now and in the future, SLCM
platforms. Improved coastal AAW, possible in harbors and
near maritime facilities via integration of local naval
forces or berthed warships into an air-defense network
controlled by MDZ commanders, will ensure security of naval
bases and maritime industry requisite for a protracted
conflict. Complemented by a further air-defense layer
inshore, the capability of hostile weapons to damage
maritime targets or even strategic assets such as air bases
or C-^I facilities is less likely and therefore not to the
advantage of Soviet strategic planners. Maintenance of
secure coastal regions in the Western European nations also
will contribute to forward maritime operations, ensuring the
secure landing of forces and materials for support of NATO
forces, and contribute to the territorial integrity of our
allies. SLOC continuity from beginning to end, which
coastal defense considerations will strengthen, is a
necessity for NATO survival and victory in a confrontation
with the East.
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The best course for today's US Navy to chart in meeting
the full spectrum of the threat posed by Soviet strategic
and maritime forces should begin with including coastal
defense considerations in an extended Maritime strategy.
The operational preparedness of our forces to counter
threats such as that posed in Soviet SLA-SLCMs can then be
enhanced by importing major attention to the readiness of
the MDZ program, and improvement of that program into a true
coastal defense element of our national security. The
aspects of the MDZ effort related to near-coast ASW should
be expanded so as to develop a capable force to deal with
possible subsurface threats near our shores, as
cruise-missile firing platforms, mining units, subversive
forces deployment units, or forces deployed to disrupt and
destroy SLOC constituents. The near-coast ASW threat can be
lessened by a robust capability of mid-ocean ASW, also
supporting planned convoy forces enroute. This potential
must exist in planning guidance such as in an extended
Maritime Strategy, before it is executed by tactical-
operational US naval forces.
Second rate technology in these Western forces is
unsatisfactory for confronting seasoned capable platforms
that may escape the grip of forward operating naval
elements. Technology must pace the threat in all operating
regions, not only front-line forces. The refurbishment of
our naval reserve forces, such as the recent assignment of
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F/A-18S to a US Navy Reserve Squadron can not be
understated, as these forces will probably also meet capable
Soviet foes in the throws of battle, and should be equipped
to do so. Outfitting NRF vessels, with the improved version
of the SM-2 missile noted in the naval posture of the
Defense Secretary earlier, may enable them to successfully
counter Soviet SLCMs targeted on US naval bases, maritime
industry or strategic forces within the continent.
Coastal defense contributes to the defense of the
territory of the United States in depth, from shore-based
military posts, to inland strategic forces, governmental
locations, critical industry and resources, and population
centers. The Navy's place in meeting the national security
requirement of a secure perimeter, in peace and in time of
war is clear. Traditional naval missions are part of the
coastal defense concept, ASW and AAW against all forms of
hostile threats, Soviet or otherwise. Countering the
emerging strategic land-attack capability which the
deployment of SLCMs will provide soviet naval forces and
strategic planners is a mission for which the US Navy is
capable today with broader vision, and training and
employment of existing assets in defensive realms to augment
and support forward operating forces. Foirward thinking in
planning naval participation of the US Navy, today and
tomorrow, in the Air Defense Initiative will enable the navy
to maintain the credible and capable forward posture and
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defense capability near-to-home, and to attain and employ
the best means modern technological innovation can provide.
D. MEETING THE FUTURE SLA-SLCM THREAT: ADI AND THE US NAVY
The Navy can and must act as the lead service in
considerations of directions and applications for resulting
capabilities evolved under the Air Defense Initiative. As
the maritime aspects of the air-defense problem are the
first a threat will encounter, they must also receive the
initial consideration in potential future improvements which
ADI programs will yield. The participation of the US Navy,
in properly guiding efforts related to maritime aspects of
air-defense is logical, much as a forward offense is the
militarily best method to confront the Soviet threat potent-
ial. The ADI efforts must span the scope of naval warfare,
from air to subsurface, and all missions including warning,
detection, tracking and attacking, to achieve victory over
any naval forces or threats from within the maritime
environment. Key technology topics and military subjects
upon which ADI can be focused by an interactive and leading
US Navy are in ASW and AAW, and will contribute to effective
defense against SLA-SLCMs, and in the total defense of the
US coastal perimeter and shore-based maritime-related
activities which they Soviets declare are strategic targets
in wartime.
In ASW, future research should be channeled into
technological programs to improve long-range passive
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detection and tracking capabilities. This can be achieved
in modernization efforts of the western ocean surveillance
systems, so as to permit detection and tracking of SLCM
carrying submarines during pre-hostilities dispersals, or of
'leakers' through Allied and US naval force nets once the
conflict is engaged. Multiple systems which are survivable
will ensure operability even with initial hostile efforts to
deny the West its intelligence 'eyes and ears.' Further
improvements to the mobile towed array platforms, SURTASS
vessels, and interoperability between these units and other
theater commands such as MDZs will permit more efficient
mobilization of critically scarce forces to meet identified
threats in wartime. Integration of rear theater maritime
capabilities into the major command and control networks
will allow for broader utilization of available intelligence
in wartime.
This aspect alone may allow MDZ commanders to direct
assets into probable threat zones rather than engage in
broad area, thinly spread defensive searching. Integration
means can also be explored for effecting air-defense
elements from in-port naval vessels in coordinated defenses
of naval bases and surrounding maritime industry. Battle-
management capabilities for the MDZ commanders are as
important as those of forward operational forces, and C-^I
efforts within pro-maritime oriented ADI efforts may realize
better coastal defense networks in the future.
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within the warfare area of ASW are also possible
technological contributions to airborne ASW platforms. A
missile-launch detection system for especially all MPA and
other air-ASW assets would greatly enhance the contributions
these platforms can make to SLCM defense. The possibility
of airship radar-warning platforms was already explored and
is actively being pursued by the Navy today. Applications
of side-looking radar technology to these platforms, or to
other air-ASW platforms may improve detection of SLCMs once
launched, and improve chances of killing these weapons
before they reach our coasts. Integrating the information
from these warning and detection systems into the MDZ
Commanders battle-management network is yet another
direction for Navy guided ADI efforts.
Another mainly naval mission worth directed ADI efforts
is the naval-AAW problem, starting with means to track
cruise-missiles, both subsonic like the SS-NX-21 and super-
sonic like the SS-NX-24. These tasks again require a whole
different set of technological imperatives possible through
ADI. Then, an effective means must be gained to kill SLCM
weapons (and ALCMs too) once naval forces are able to track
them throughout their travel. Countering the subsonic
cruise-missiles will require improvements in our own missile
seeker capabilities to discern the targets from sea-clutter,
while supersonic targets will necessitate faster and longer
range kill vehicles. Better missile guidance and propulsion
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systems along with warhead improvements are possible through
ADI program efforts. Equipping MPA, armed-surveillance
aircraft and detection platforms with these improved
counter-SLCM weapons can improve the engagement ratio needed
for a advantage against a massed large-scale air-breather
attack from off our coasts which the Soviet could initiate
with SLA-SLCMs.
Thus the opportunities for gains in counter-SLCM warfare
are many with a strong maritime orientation in the ADI which
a pro-active US Navy stance can bring about. Technological
advances in ASW and AAW methods and means can profit both
forward offensive and rear-defensive forces envisioned under
the extended broad Maritime Strategy. These advancements
will further improve the capabilities of an invigorated MDZ
program and a US Navy committed to both a strong forward
offense, a survivable and capable maritime support link to
an overseas battle area, and a US Navy also attuned and
prepared to meet territorial defense requirements in
defending our coastlines, bases and maritime industry.
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